If Some Nonsentient Entity Had Intrinsic Value, What Would Follow?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VI, p. 41 of the PDF edition · English translation

Consider the following question: do the nonsentient entities valued by environmentalism (such as ecosystems, species, natural processes, etc.) have value in themselves, or do they have value only as resources for sentient beings? It is often assumed that if they have intrinsic value, then killing nonhuman animals to preserve them is justified, as is prohibiting helping animals in the wild who are victims of natural processes. However, as we will see, this idea is mistaken.

To begin with, the idea that there is value beyond sentience is, to say the least, highly controversial. For example, it would imply that a universe without any sentient beings could still be better or worse, even though there would be no one in that universe for whom things could be better or worse (since in such a universe there would be no one at all). Nevertheless, let us suppose for the sake of argument that the entities valued in environmentalism really did have value in themselves. This would not necessarily imply that harming animals to preserve them, or prohibiting helping wild animals who are victims of natural processes, is therefore justified, since there could be reasons to prioritize sentient beings over nonsentient entities.

The idea that the basic interests of sentient beings should take priority over nonsentient entities is already widely accepted when what is at stake is the good of humans. This is accepted by environmentalists themselves. Environmentalists generally hold that environmentalist goals are more important than certain human interests (such as economic, aesthetic, and recreational interests), but not more important than basic human interests, such as not suffering and not dying. But if speciesism is unjustifiable, then there is also no justification for holding that it is right to kill nonhuman animals or cause them suffering in order to achieve environmentalist goals, or that we should not help them when they are victims of natural processes.

But what if someone claimed that we should sacrifice sentient beings – human and nonhuman – for the sake of environmentalist goals⁵⁴? This position is not speciesist, but that does not mean it is justified, since there are reasons to prioritize sentient beings. The

main reason is as follows. Unlike nonsentient entities, sentient beings can literally be harmed and benefited, whether through negative experiences (all forms of suffering) or through being deprived of positive experiences (as happens when they die, for example). These are particularly serious harms. Species, ecosystems, natural processes, ecological balance, biodiversity, etc. may be present to a greater or lesser degree; they may exist or disappear; but they cannot experience the horror of excruciating suffering, nor be deprived of good years of positive experiences, because nonsentient entities are not someone.

For these reasons, even if the entities valued in environmentalism had intrinsic value, there would still be strong reasons, in cases of conflict, to prioritize the good of sentient beings. Two main conclusions follow from this. The first is that, even if we ought to accept environmentalist goals, there would still be no justification for causing suffering or death to sentient beings in trying to achieve those goals. The second is that, even if we ought to accept environmentalist goals, this would not be enough to reject the proposal to help animals who live in the wild and are victims of natural processes.