Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics · chapter 2
The Case for Considering All Sentient Beings
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
The main arguments for considering all sentient beings are the argument from species overlap, the argument from relevance, the principle of equal consideration, and the impartiality argument; the table also covers testing for speciesism, the benefit of the doubt, priorities, and desert.
This chapter shows the main arguments for why everyone who can feel should be respected: because what matters is being able to feel, because everyone's pain counts the same, and because no one would choose unfair rules without knowing who they were going to be.
They are like the pillars of a bridge: each one holds it up from one side, and together they make the structure solid.
- P1 If lacking certain capacities does not justify treating humans worse, it does not justify treating animals worse either (species overlap).
- P2 What is relevant to consideration is being able to be harmed and benefited, which depends on sentience (relevance).
- P3 Equal harms and benefits should carry the same weight (equal consideration).
- P4 If we did not know whether we would be born human or animal, we would not accept the current treatment (impartiality).
- C So every sentient being should receive full moral consideration.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “The greater harm should not always take priority, for example if the victim deserved it.”
Answer To deserve a harm, one has to be morally responsible and to have broken a rule, which is not the case with animals.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XII, p. 11 of the PDF edition · English translation
We will now look at the main arguments in defense of the of nonhuman animals5. All of these arguments converge on the conclusion that every being (that is, every being capable of suffering and enjoyment) should receive full moral consideration (and not merely some consideration, at a lower level). We will also look at some questions related to these arguments. In this section we will not yet discuss the criticisms that have been made of sentience-centered ethics, nor how its proponents have defended it. That will be done in the next section.
| Argument | What the argument says |
|---|---|
| Argument from species overlap6. (II, ch. 2). | If the lack of certain capacities and relationships in certain humans does not justify treating them worse than the humans who have these capacities and relationships, then the lack of these capacities and relationships in nonhuman animals does not justify treating them worse than humans. |
| Argument from relevance7. (II, ch. 1). | What is at stake in questions of moral consideration is the possibility that our decisions harm or benefit those affected. Hence, all those who can be harmed and benefited should receive moral consideration. Sentience is what makes someone capable of experiencing things as positive or negative (hence, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for someone to be capable of being harmed and benefited). Therefore, sentience is what is relevant to moral consideration |
| Principle of equal consideration8. (II, ch. 5). | We should not be biased in assigning weight to each individual's good. What matters is the magnitude of the harms and benefits, and not factors that do not result from merit or demerit (such as the species, race, or gender to which someone belongs). Benefits and harms of the same magnitude should receive the same weight, regardless of the species, race, or gender of whoever would receive them. |
| Argument from 9 impartiality. (II, ch. 10). | A fair decision must be impartial (that is, it cannot be biased). A decision is impartial if it is the one we would choose if we did not know which position we would occupy among those affected. If we did not know whether we would be born as humans or as nonhuman animals, we would not consider the way animals are currently treated to be fair. Hence, the way animals are currently treated is not fair. |
| Related questions | |
| How can we test whether we are being biased with regard to animals? (II, ch. 11) | We can ask whether we would keep the same decision: (1) if we did not know the species of those affected; (2) if we did not know the species to which we belong; (3) if the victims were human; (4) if we had to bear the harms it causes in order to obtain the benefits it brings (or so that other individuals obtain these benefits). |
| What about animals we are not sure are sentient? (II, ch. 13). | We should apply the principle of the benefit of the doubt. This is because, if an animal is sentient and we act as though it were not, the resulting harm is greater than if the animal is not sentient and we treat it as though it were. In short, the principle of the benefit of the doubt suggests erring on the side of caution. |
| If we give equal consideration, how do we decide questions of priority? (II, ch. 8). | Some examples of criteria: (1) the worse the individual's situation, the higher their priority; (2) the greater the number of individuals in a bad situation, the higher the priority; (3) the greater the size of the benefit that can be brought to those in a bad situation, the higher the priority; (4) the greater the positive impact that one or more individuals would have from then on if they are helped, the higher their priority. |
| The greater harm should not always receive priority (for example, if whoever suffers the harm deserves it) (II, ch. 6). | Even if this makes sense, it could not justify failing to prioritize nonhuman animals when they suffer the greater harm, since, for someone to deserve the harm they suffer, they need to be an accountable agent and to have violated some rule that makes them deserving of the harm. This is not the case with nonhuman animals, since they are not accountable agents (the same goes for babies and for humans who lack certain cognitive capacities, for example). |
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
Which principle suggests "erring on the side of caution" with beings whose sentience is uncertain?
Which of these is NOT one of the priority criteria compatible with equal consideration mentioned in the table?
Food for thought
Which of these four arguments do you find strongest? Why?
Author’s notes 5
Sources cited in this text 7
The full list for the volume is in the Volume XII references.
- CUNHA, L. C. A igualdade, suas várias interpretações, e a ética interespécies. In: BARBOSA-FOHRMANN, A. P.; LOURENÇO, D. B.; AUBERT, A. C. P. (orgs.). Estudos e direitos dos animais: teorias e desafios. Porto Alegre: Editora Fi, 2022b, p. 104-128.
- CUNHA, L. C. Uma breve introdução à ética animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Appris, 2021.
- EHNERT, J. The argument from species overlap. Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2002.
- HORTA, O. Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, v. 31, n. 3, p. 369-388, 2018a.
- HORTA. O. The Scope of the Argument from Species Overlap. Journal of Applied Philosophy, v. 31, p. 142-154, 2014.
- ROWLANDS, M. Animal rights: Moral, theory and practice. 2. ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 [1998].
- SINGER, P. Ética Prática. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002 [1993].
Go deeper on each point
The chapters the author points to in the tables above.
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