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Volume II · Considering Sentient Beings · chapter 4

Which Beings Are Sentient?

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To find out which beings are sentient, we look at evidence: a centralized nervous system, other physiological indicators, overall behavior, and evolutionary advantage. Many invertebrates meet these criteria, and non-organic sentience is a future possibility.

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume II, p. 16 of the PDF edition · English translation

4.1. Why is it important to know which beings are sentient?

It is important to know which beings are sentient because sentience is what makes a being capable of being harmed and benefited. This is so because it is (that is, the capacity to have experiences) that makes that being someone rather than something, and because experiences can be experienced as positive or negative (that is, they have 9).

There are three main types of criteria for investigating which beings are sentient: physiological, behavioral, and evolutionary10. We will look at each of them below.

4.2. The presence of a centralized nervous system

The main physiological criterion is the presence of a nervous system with a centralizing organ (such as a brain or ganglia, for example). Information reaches the organism through the nervous system, but it is the processing of that information, which takes place in the centralizing organ, that provides the conditions for consciousness to arise11.

This means that organisms that lack a nervous system (such as bacteria, protozoa, fungi, plants, and animals of the phylum Porifera, such as sponges) or that have a nervous system but no centralizing organ (such as animals of the phylum Cnidaria, such as jellyfish, and of the phylum Echinodermata, such as sea cucumbers) lack the structures necessary for consciousness to arise12.

4.3. Other physiological indicators

This first type of criterion (the presence of a centralized nervous system) is the main one, with the following criteria being additional indicators that a being is sentient. That being so, it is possible for an organism to be sentient without meeting these other additional criteria.

However, it does not seem possible for an organism to be sentient by meeting the additional criteria without having a physical structure that meets the first criterion, since in that case there would be no way for the organism to process the information received by the nervous system and create the conditions for consciousness to arise.

Other additional physiological criteria are the presence in the organism of substances that act as painkillers13 and the presence of nociceptors14 (which detect harmful or potentially harmful stimuli and send this kind of information to the brain).

4.4. Behavior

The second type of additional criterion is behavioral15. If a being has a centralized nervous system, the way it behaves can be an additional reason to think it is sentient.

For example, if an animal's behavior changes in response to stimuli under various kinds of conditions, it is probably avoiding stimuli that generate negative experiences and seeking stimuli that generate positive experiences.

That being so, to investigate whether the way a being behaves is additional evidence that it is sentient, what matters is not investigating how it behaves in specific situations, but how it behaves in general.

4.5. Evolutionary advantage

The third type of additional criterion is evolutionary advantage. The traits most likely to be passed on are those that are most efficient at transmitting genetic information. The parts of the body responsible for creating the conditions for consciousness to arise require a considerable investment of energy on the part of the organism. For example, in humans up to 20% of the energy consumed is spent keeping the brain active16. For this reason, the traits responsible for creating the conditions for consciousness to arise probably prevailed because they provided an advantage in terms of transmitting genetic information (since, if that were not the case, other traits that use much less energy would most likely have prevailed).

Thus, there is an evolutionary advantage for animals in being conscious, since, because they can move around in their environment, they are able to flee harmful stimuli and seek positive ones. This contributes indirectly to their survival, which in turn increases the likelihood that they will pass on their genetic information.

This is not the case, for example, with plants, since they cannot move. In their case, maintaining the structures necessary for consciousness to arise would involve a considerable expenditure of energy and would not result in any evolutionary advantage.

4.6. What is the minimum degree of centralization?

There is still no consensus on the minimum degree of centralization a nervous system must have (in terms of the number of neurons and the interaction among them) in order to provide the conditions for consciousness to arise.

It is known, however, that it need not be a brain like that of humans, nor like that of mammals, nor even like that of vertebrates17. For example, cephalopods meet all the criteria for sentience and are invertebrates18. There is also a series of studies suggesting that many kinds of insects, crustaceans, and other arthropods

are very probably sentient19. For this reason, it is a mistake to think that the sentience criterion excludes invertebrates from .

4.7. The possibility of non-organic sentience

It is also possible that a being need not even be organic to be sentient. If sentience appears whenever a physical structure is organized in such a way that it performs certain functions, and this is independent of the material that makes up that physical structure, then it is possible that non-organic sentient beings20 will come to exist in the future (for example, in digital media).

This may sound strange at first. However, there is a thought experiment that can help us understand this possibility. Imagine that we undergo surgery that involves replacing some of our organic neurons with neurons made of some non-organic material. If, after the surgery, the new neurons continue to perform the same functions, and the experiences associated with them remain present, this would be a reason to think that sentience is possible in non-organic beings. For example, if we kept periodically replacing the rest of our current neurons with non-organic neurons until all of them had been replaced, and the experiences did not fade away, this would be a strong indication that non-organic sentience is possible.

So far, every sentient being belongs to the animal kingdom. But this may change in the future.

Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume II
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Practice

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To assess behavior as evidence of sentience, the chapter recommends looking at...

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Food for thought

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Author’s notes 12
  1. 9 For a definition of valence, see Fridja (1986, p. 207). ↩
  2. 10 On these criteria, see Ética Animal (2015a). ↩
  3. 11 To accept this claim, it is not necessary to assume a specific theory about the nature of consciousness, since all the claim says is that, if a certain type of processing takes place in the centralizing organ, consciousness appears. This is compatible both with the claim that consciousness is a state of the brain or is generated by the brain, and with the claim that it is something distinct that interacts with the brain when the brain is in a certain state. For an introduction to the various theories about the nature of consciousness, see Van Gulick (2021). On the role of the central nervous system in providing the conditions for consciousness to arise, see Ética Animal (2015a, 2015c). ↩
  4. 12 For more information on this point, see Ética Animal (2015e). ↩
  5. 13 On this, see Kavaliers; Hirst; Tesky (1983). ↩
  6. 14 On this, see (2004). ↩
  7. 15 On this topic, see (1989). ↩
  8. 16 See Ética Animal (2015a). ↩
  9. 17 On this, see Smith (1991); (2001) and Mather; Anderson (2007). ↩
  10. 18 See Low (2012). ↩
  11. 19 For a review of these studies, see Ética Animal (2019a, 2021d, 2022b). See also Smith (1991); Mather (2001); Mather; Anderson (2007); Elwood; Barr; Patterson (2009) and (2014). ↩
  12. 20 On this, see (2015b). ↩
Sources cited in this text 18

The full list for the volume is in the Volume II references.

  • BROOM, D. M. Sentience and animal welfare. Wallingford: CABI, 2014.
  • ELWOOD, R. W.; BARR, S.; PATTERSON, L. Pain and stress in crustaceans? Applied Animal Behaviour Science, v. 118, p. 128-136, 2009.
  • FRIDJA, N.H. The Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
  • KAVALIERS, M.; HIRST, M.; TESKY, G. C. A functional role for an opiate system in snail thermal behaviour. Science, v. 220, p. 99-101, 1983.
  • LOW, P. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. In: PANKSEPP, J.; REISS, D.; EDELMAN, D.; VAN SWINDEREN, B.; LOW, P.; KOCH, C. (orgs.). Francis Crick Memorial Conference on Consciousness in Human and non-Human Animals, 07 jul. 2012.
  • MATHER, J. A. Animal suffering: An invertebrate perspective. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, v. 4, p. 151-156, 2001.
  • MATHER, J. A.; ANDERSON, R. C. Ethics and invertebrates: A cephalopod perspective. Diseases of Aquatic Organisms, v. 75, p. 119-129, 2007.
  • ROLLIN, B. The unheeded cry: animal consciousness, animal pain and science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
  • SMITH, J. A. A question of pain in invertebrates. ILAR Journal, v. 33, p. 25-31, 1991.
  • SNEDDON, L. U. Evolution of nociception in vertebrates: Comparative analysis of lower vertebrates. Brain Research Reviews, v. 46, p. 123-130, 2004.
  • TOMASIK, B. Why digital sentience is relevant to animal activists. Animal Charity Evaluators. 03 fev. 2015b.
  • VAN GULICK, R. Consciousness. In: ZALTA, E. N. (org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2021 Edition.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Critérios para reconhecer a senciência. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 24 out. 2015a.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. O problema da consciência. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 24 out. 2015c.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Que seres não são conscientes? Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 19 out. 2015e.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Senciência em invertebrados: uma revisão da literatura neurocientífica. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 20 ago. 2019a.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Senciência em invertebrados: uma revisão das evidências comportamentais. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 20 jul. 2022b.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Uma fisiologia ilustrada do sistema nervoso de invertebrados. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 3 set. 2021d.

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