Volume II · Considering Sentient Beings · chapter 5
Why Equal Consideration?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
The principle of equal consideration says that harms and benefits of similar magnitude should have the same weight, whoever they belong to; violating it is speciesism, which isn't limited to exploitation, to total disregard, or to anthropocentrism.
A pain of the same size is just as bad whether it's in you, your neighbor, or a pig. Treating equal pains as if they were different because of who feels them is unfair.
A fair scale weighs the rice, not the brand on the bag. Equal consideration weighs the size of the harm, not the species of whoever suffers it.
- P1 Harms and benefits of similar magnitude should be given the same weight.
- P2 Giving less weight to a harm just because of species violates this principle.
- P3 Speciesism can happen through exploitation, through failing to help, through lesser consideration, or against certain species of animals.
- C Therefore, equal consideration requires rejecting all these forms of speciesism.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “Equal consideration doesn't mean equal treatment; a pig doesn't need to vote.”
Answer Exactly, and the principle agrees: it asks for equal weight for equal interests. A pig has no interest in voting, but he does have an interest in not suffering and not dying.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume II, p. 20 of the PDF edition · English translation
5.1. Hierarchical views
A very common view is that we should give some consideration to nonhuman animals, but that we should give greater consideration to humans.
Another view, sometimes defended, is that beings with greater cognitive capacities should receive greater consideration than beings with lesser cognitive capacities (whether they are human or nonhuman). According to this view, normal adult humans should receive greater consideration than nonhuman animals, children, and humans with cognitive impairments. For the same reason, according to this view, animals such as mammals should receive greater consideration than, for example, fish or insects.
In short, these views build hierarchies of .
5.2. The principle of equal consideration
There is, however, a principle, called the principle of 21, which suggests that the very idea of a hierarchy of moral status is biased. According to the principle of equal consideration, all morally considerable beings have the same moral standing. The principle of equal consideration is explained in more detail below.
The idea of equal consideration is already built into the argument from relevance. If we have reasons to give to someone because that someone can be harmed and benefited, then the strength of those reasons depends on the magnitude of the harms and benefits at stake — and not on the species, race, or gender to which they belong, their capacities, the relationships they have with others, and so on. In short, in an unbiased approach, harms and benefits of similar magnitude receive the same weight, and greater harms and benefits receive greater weight than lesser harms and benefits. This is what it means to give equal consideration to those affected by a decision.
This suggests, then, that not only is there no justification for excluding nonhuman animals from the sphere of moral consideration: there is also no justification for giving them lesser consideration22. That is why speciesism23 is analogous to racism: both violate this principle and are therefore forms of discrimination24.
Note that the principle of equal consideration is compatible with (in fact, requires) prioritizing this or that individual depending on the circumstances. This is because the principle prescribes that greater harms receive greater weight. However, the principle requires that this be done in an unbiased way.
For example, if in a certain situation I prioritize A because he is more seriously injured, then if in another situation it is B who is more seriously injured, I should prioritize B. I would be discriminating against B if, in this second situation, I chose not to prioritize him because of his race, gender, species, and so on.
In short, according to the principle of equal consideration, although the good of each affected individual receives the same weight, the magnitude of the harms and benefits to which they would be subject may differ (and, therefore, the reasons for prioritizing this or that individual may vary).
5.3. Violations of the principle of equal consideration
The principle of equal consideration is routinely violated in practices that affect nonhuman animals. For example, if the experiments that are widely accepted when performed on nonhuman animals25 were performed on humans, subjecting them to a similar harm (suffering of similar magnitude and harming them through death to the same extent, for example), they would be widely repudiated. This is an example of a case in which harms of similar magnitude receive different weight depending on whether the victim is human or nonhuman.
There are, moreover, more blatant violations of the principle of equal consideration, which occur not when similar harms receive different weight, but when lesser harms receive greater weight than greater harms. These violations are extremely common. The very use of animals for food production is an example. If humans stop eating animals, they do not suffer a great harm. They just have to eat plant-based food. But if humans choose to eat them, the animals, in addition to usually living a life full of suffering, also lose their lives26.
5.4. Speciesism is not limited to exploitation
As we have seen, is one form of violation of the principle of equal consideration. However, nonhuman animals are also disadvantaged in a biased way even in situations in which they are not exploited. An example is the claim that nonhuman animals, when they are victims of natural processes27 such as disease, thirst, hunger, and natural disasters, should be left to their fate, but that humans in similar situations should be rescued.
5.5. Speciesism is not limited to total disregard
One of the main implications of the principle of equal consideration is that an individual is discriminated against (that is, receives unjust unfavorable treatment) not only when their good is completely disregarded, but also when, for unjust reasons, their good receives less weight compared with the good of other individuals. That is why giving lesser consideration to the good of nonhuman animals is also unjustly disadvantaging them, even if some consideration is given to their good.
5.6. Speciesism is not limited to anthropocentric speciesism
There are also non-anthropocentric forms of , which rank the degree of moral consideration given to different nonhuman animals. For example, animals
such as dogs and cats generally receive greater consideration than fish, chickens, pigs, and cows. It is also common for animals considered more intelligent to receive greater consideration than animals considered less intelligent; for large animals to receive greater consideration than very small ones, such as insects; and so on. As should be clear by now, all of this violates the principle of equal consideration.
In what we have seen above, we focused mainly on examining . There were three reasons for this. The first is that anthropocentrism is by far the most prevalent of all forms of speciesism. The second is that humans are usually placed at the top of the hierarchy. Even the animals favored by non-anthropocentric forms of speciesism typically receive far less consideration than humans do, and things are done to them that would never be considered acceptable if done to humans. Finally, the third reason is that what explains why anthropocentrism is unjustifiable (violating the principle of equal consideration) implies that any other form of speciesism is unjustifiable.
In fact, the principle of equal consideration explains the moral irrelevance of the species criterion in general, regardless of whether hierarchies are drawn among members of different species. For example, it is sometimes said that using animals in experiments is right as long as it benefits other animals of the same species. To see the problem with this argument, consider that in the past human victims were used in experiments aimed at benefiting other humans. The fact that the victims and the beneficiaries belong to the same species does not seem to make such practices justifiable. They equally violate the principle of equal consideration by assigning different weight to the good of the affected individuals.
5.7. Other little-noticed forms of discrimination
Another important implication of the principle of equal consideration is that it rejects hierarchies of moral standing based not only on race, gender, and species, but also on size, degrees of cognitive capacity, and the type of substrate that makes up the being's body (that is, whether or not it is organic).
For example, if non-organic sentient beings come to exist in the future (for example, in digital media), according to the principle of equal consideration the good of these beings should receive the same weight as the good of organic sentient beings28. In short, according to the principle of equal consideration, all sentient beings count equally29.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
Is giving animals consideration, but to a lesser degree, compatible with equal consideration?
Valuing dogs and devaluing pigs is...
Food for thought
In what situations do you treat animals of different species differently even though they suffer in the same way?
Author’s notes 9
- 21 The best-known formulation of this principle can be found in (2002[1979], p. 29-35). ↩
- 22 For a more detailed explanation of this principle, see Singer (2002 [1979], ch. 3) and (2021, p. 61-6) ↩
- 23 For a detailed analysis of what speciesism is, see (2022 [2010]). ↩
- 24 On the definition of discrimination, see Boxill (1991); (1998); Lippert-rasmussen (2006, 2007) and Horta (2010a). ↩
- 25 For a description of these experiments, see Ética Animal (2016d) and Singer (2004 [1975], ch. 2). ↩
- 26 On these costs, see Ética Animal (2021a). ↩
- 27 For a detailed description of how animals are harmed by natural processes, see Ética Animal (2016a) and (2020). For a discussion of the ethical implications, see Cunha (2022a). ↩
- 28 On this, see (2015b). ↩
- 29 For a criticism of the idea of hierarchies of moral status, see Horta (2017b). ↩
Sources cited in this text 16
The full list for the volume is in the Volume II references.
- ANIMAL ETHICS. Introduction to wild animal suffering: A guide to the issues. Oakland: Animal Ethics, 2020.
- BOXILL, B. R. Equality, discrimination and preferential treatment. In: SINGER, P. (org.) A companion to ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, p. 333-343..
- CUNHA, L. C. Razões para ajudar: o sofrimento dos animais selvagens e suas implicações éticas. Curitiba: Appris, 2022a.
- CUNHA, L. C. Uma breve introdução à ética animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Appris, 2021.
- HORTA, O. Discrimination in terms of moral exclusion. Theoria: Swedish Journal of Philosophy, v. 76, p. 346-364, 2010a.
- HORTA, O. O que é o especismo? Ethic@, v. 21, n. 1, p. 162-193, 2022 [2010].
- HORTA, O. Why the Concept of Moral Status Should Be Abandoned. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, v.20, p. 899-910, 2017b.
- LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, K. Discrimination. In: RYBERG, J.; PETERSEN, T. S.; WOLF, C. (orgs.). New waves in applied ethics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 51-72.
- LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, K. Private discrimination: A prioritarian, desert-accommodating account. San Diego Law Review, v. 43, p. 817-856, 2006.
- SINGER, P. Libertação Animal. Porto Alegre/São Paulo: Lugano, 2004 [1975].
- SINGER, P. Ética Prática. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002 [1979].
- TOMASIK, B. Why digital sentience is relevant to animal activists. Animal Charity Evaluators. 03 fev. 2015b.
- WASSERMAN, D. Discrimination, Concept of. In: CHADWICK, R. (org.) Encyclopedia of applied ethics. San Diego: Academic Press, 1998, p. 805-814.
- ÉTICA ANIMAL. A situação dos animais na natureza. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 23 out. 2016a.
- ÉTICA ANIMAL. Experimentação em animais. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 26 abr. 2016d.
- ÉTICA ANIMAL. Quem paga o preço da carne?. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 30 jun. 2021a.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
Principle of equal consideration8. (II, ch. 5).
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