Questão
de Ética
PT

Volume II · Considering Sentient Beings · chapter 3

What Is Sentience and Why Does It Matter?

2 min readBasic level3 notes12 sources

Select a passage to highlight, annotate or share
New to this topic? Read the simplified version first, written for beginners (2 min).

Before you read study layer, not part of the original text

Sentience is the capacity to have positive and negative experiences; it's what makes someone a “someone” rather than a “something,” and so able to be harmed by the presence of what's bad or the absence of what's good.

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume II, p. 14 of the PDF edition · English translation

If what is relevant to knowing to whom to give moral consideration is knowing who can be harmed and benefited, then it is important to investigate what makes someone capable of being harmed and benefited. That is where the importance of sentience6 lies.

The term "" is used in the animal ethics debate as a synonym for consciousness. It refers to any and every experience someone could have, starting with the simplest. It also refers to any other mental state someone could have, such as desires, intentions, memories, and so on. It is what makes there be someone, an individual inhabiting a body, and not merely a living, empty body. It is what separates, on the one hand, a human, a dog, a fish, and a bee7 and, on the other, a shoe, a plant, a bacterium, and a fungus. Thus, sentience determines who can be harmed or benefited because it is sentience, in the first place, that determines when there is someone and not merely something.

Moreover, another feature of sentience, essential for there to be the possibility of harm and benefit, is that experiences have what is called 8 - that is, they can be experienced as positive or negative. This is also what makes sentient beings prefer to be in a certain condition rather than another (that is, it is what gives them desires and preferences).

For this reason, there are two basic ways in which a sentient being is harmed: by the presence of what is negative for them (as happens when they suffer, for example) and by the absence of what is positive for them (as happens when they die or are in some other way prevented from enjoying something that would benefit them).

Similarly, there are two basic ways in which a sentient being is benefited: by the presence of what is positive for them (as happens when they feel pleasure, for example) and by the prevention of what is negative for them (as happens when suffering is relieved, for example).

That is why nonhuman animals need consideration. It is not because they belong to the animal kingdom, or because they are alive in a biological sense (as plants are, for example). It is because they are someone and because they are capable of being harmed or benefited.

Therefore, to know which beings to consider, it is important to know which ones are sentient. How can we investigate this? We will address this topic next.

Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume II
See the whole theme

Practice

Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.

What are the two basic ways of harming a sentient being?

Why does sentience matter for ethics?

Food for thought

How would you explain the difference between “breaking” an object and “hurting” someone?

Author’s notes 3
  1. 6 For examples of defenses of the sentience criterion, see (1996[1989], p. 282n); (2002 [1979], p. 67); (2018a) and (2021, p. 57-61). ↩
  2. 7 On sentience in invertebrates, see Smith (1991); (2001); Mather e Anderson (2007); (2014) and Ética Animal (2019a, 2021d, 2022b). ↩
  3. 8 For a definition of valence, see Fridja (1986, p. 207). ↩
Sources cited in this text 12

The full list for the volume is in the Volume II references.

  • BENTHAM, J. Introduction to the principles of moral and legislation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 [1789].
  • BROOM, D. M. Sentience and animal welfare. Wallingford: CABI, 2014.
  • CUNHA, L. C. Uma breve introdução à ética animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Appris, 2021.
  • FRIDJA, N.H. The Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
  • HORTA, O. Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, v. 31, n. 3, p. 369-388, 2018a.
  • MATHER, J. A. Animal suffering: An invertebrate perspective. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, v. 4, p. 151-156, 2001.
  • MATHER, J. A.; ANDERSON, R. C. Ethics and invertebrates: A cephalopod perspective. Diseases of Aquatic Organisms, v. 75, p. 119-129, 2007.
  • SINGER, P. Ética Prática. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002 [1979].
  • SMITH, J. A. A question of pain in invertebrates. ILAR Journal, v. 33, p. 25-31, 1991.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Senciência em invertebrados: uma revisão da literatura neurocientífica. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 20 ago. 2019a.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Senciência em invertebrados: uma revisão das evidências comportamentais. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 20 jul. 2022b.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Uma fisiologia ilustrada do sistema nervoso de invertebrados. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 3 set. 2021d.

Recommended texts

Keep exploring Considering Sentient Beings.

Browse the themes