Volume XII · The Essentials of Animal Ethics · chapter 1
Attempts to Justify Disregarding Animals
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
The attempts to justify disregarding animals (species, soul, capacities, potential, group, biology, nature, tradition, ethics as a human invention or activity, self-protection, authority, degree of suffering, ecosystems) fail to explain why these criteria would be relevant.
This chapter gathers all the most common excuses for mistreating animals and shows, in one sentence each, why they do not work.
It is like a handbook with answers to the questions a vegan hears most often.
- P1 The default position says that the use of animals is fully justified.
- P2 Each justification appeals to a criterion: species, capacities, nature, tradition, authority, and so on.
- P3 None explains why that criterion would be relevant to whether someone can be harmed.
- C So the default position is not justified.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “Using animals is natural and traditional.”
Answer From the fact that a behavior is natural or traditional, it does not follow that it is good, fair, or even acceptable.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume XII, p. 8 of the PDF edition · English translation
Animals are exploited and killed by humans every day for a wide variety of purposes. They are used as food, clothing, test models, for entertainment, leisure, and as workers or tools. Such use, besides causing their deaths, most of the time also causes them intense suffering, from the moment of birth until the moment they are killed. Despite the harms these activities entail for animals, the default position is that such use is fully justified. Below is a summary of the debate on this topic1. On one side are the attempts to justify the default position2 and, on the other, the criticisms that have been raised against these attempts3.
| Attempt to justify the default position | Criticisms of the attempted justification |
|---|---|
| These animals do not belong to the human species. (I, ch. 2). | This does not explain why belonging to the human species is relevant to moral consideration |
| These animals do not belong to the species we belong to. (I, ch. 2) | This does not explain the relevance of the species criterion. The species criterion may be arbitrary, as the criteria of race and gender are, for example. |
| These animals do not have immortal souls and were not created in the image and likeness of a deity. (I, ch. 3). | It is not possible to prove these claims. But even if it were, the argument does not explain why meeting these requirements would be relevant to receiving moral consideration |
| These animals lack certain capacities and relationships, and even the potential to develop them. For example, they have no notion of right and wrong, of justice, of rights, they have no political relationships with us, etc. (I, ch. 4 and 5). | The argument does not explain why possessing these characteristics would be relevant to moral consideration. For example, there are humans who also do not possess them (babies, for example) or who do not even have the potential to develop them (such as victims of certain diseases that are incapacitating throughout life), but this does not seem to justify disregarding them. |
| These animals do not belong to the same species as the beings who have those capacities and relationships (I, ch. 6). | This explains the relevance neither of the criterion of capacities/relationships nor of the species criterion. The argument already assumes both things in advance. |
| The species criterion is fair because it refers to biological characteristics (whereas the criteria of race and gender would be unfair because they are social constructions). (I, ch. 7). | The fact that a criterion is based on biological characteristics does not make it fair. For example, a system of slavery based on height or skin color would be based on biological characteristics. Yet it would be just as unjust as any other form of slavery. The same goes for slavery based on species. |
| It is natural and/or traditional to disregard animals (I, ch. 8 and 9). | From the fact that a behavior is natural or traditional it does not follow that it is necessarily good, fair, desirable, or even acceptable. |
| Ethics is a human creation. Therefore, all views are equally arbitrary, and we do not need to justify what we do. (I, ch. 11). | The fact that a field of knowledge was created does not imply that all positions in that field are arbitrary. In ethics, for example, there are positions that are biased in their consideration of the harms and benefits to the individuals affected, and others that are not. |
| Ethics is a human activity. Since animals are not capable of acting morally, they should not be considered. (I, ch. 10). | The beneficiaries of a certain activity do not necessarily have to be capable of performing it as well. Requiring that, in order to receive moral consideration, someone must also be capable of acting morally is like requiring that, in order to be treated by a doctor, someone must also be a doctor. |
| Humans invented ethics to protect themselves. Therefore, it is justified to disregard those individuals who have no power to threaten us. (I, ch. 12). | It has not been proven that ethics arose out of self-interest. And even if it had, that would not imply that this conception of ethics is correct. It is one thing to describe how a certain activity arose. It is another to justify a certain view within that activity. For example, the first astronomers held certain convictions that, over time, turned out to be mistaken. The same goes for ethics. |
| Humans are capable of suffering to a greater degree, owing to their high degree of cognition. Therefore, the standard treatment given to nonhuman animals is justified. (II, ch. 9). | Even if this were the case, the fact that one kind of individual suffers to a greater degree does not imply that it is justified to disregard the individuals capable of suffering to a lesser degree. Moreover, it is also possible to question the thesis that a higher degree of cognition implies greater suffering. This will be so in certain situations (for example, only someone who understands that they will be killed in a few days will suffer in anticipation), but not in others (for example, an animal that is captured to be given medication and panics because it thinks it will be killed). Furthermore, a lower degree of cognition usually comes with greater vulnerability, which gives us reasons to give these 4 individuals greater protection. |
| Only ecosystems and species matter, not individuals. (V, ch. 10, VI, ch. 14). | What is at stake in questions of moral consideration is the possibility that our decisions positively or negatively affect those they reach. That is why individuals should be the center of moral consideration, since they are the ones who can be harmed and benefited. |
| There are moral authorities (religious or otherwise) that have approved of animal exploitation. Hence, animal exploitation is justified. (I, ch. 13). | The fact that an authority approves of a given practice does not imply that it is necessarily right. What would have to be analyzed are the reasons the authority in question offered in an attempt to justify the practice. However, these reasons will be plausible or implausible whether they were offered by an authority or by anyone else. An authority's will has no power to make a bad argument good. Therefore, it is completely irrelevant whether the person who offered an argument is an authority or not. What matters is whether the argument they offered is sound. |
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
What is the criticism common to almost all the attempted justifications?
What analogy does the table use to answer the argument from ethics as a human activity?
Food for thought
Which of these justifications do you hear most often? What answer would you give?
Author’s notes 4
Sources cited in this text 9
The full list for the volume is in the Volume XII references.
- CALLICOTT, J. B. Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair. Environmental Ethics, v. 2, n. 4, p. 311-338, 1980.
- CARRUTHERS, P. The animal issue: Moral theory in practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- CUNHA, L. C. Uma breve introdução à ética animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Appris, 2021.
- HORTA, O. Un desafío para la bioética: la cuestión del especismo. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia). Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2007.
- MACHAN, T. Why Humans May Use Animals. Journal of Value Inquiry, v. 36, p. 9-14, 2002.
- ROLLIN, B. The unheeded cry: animal consciousness, animal pain and science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- SAPONTZIS, S. F. Predation. Ethics and Animals, v. 5, p. 27-38, 1984.
- SCRUTON, R Animal rights and wrongs. London: Metro, 1996.
- SINGER, P. The significance of Animal Suffering. In: BAIRD, R. M.; ROSENBAUM, S. E. (orgs.). Animal Experimentation: the Moral Issues. New York: Prometheus Books, 1991, p. 56-66.
Go deeper on each point
The chapters the author points to in the tables above.
- Vol. I Is Species What Matters?
- Vol. I Could Metaphysical Characteristics Justify Speciesism?
- Vol. I Could the Possession of Capacities or Relationships Justify Speciesism?
- Vol. I Could Humans' Supposed Potential Justify Speciesism?
- Vol. I Is What Matters Belonging to the Same Species as Those Who Have Certain Capacities?
- Vol. I If Species Are Not a Social Construct, Is Speciesism Justified?
- Vol. I If Speciesism Is Natural, Is Speciesism Justified?
- Vol. I Does the Fact That Speciesist Practices Are Traditions Show That We Should Respect Them?
- Vol. I If Ethics Is an Invention, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
- Vol. I If Ethics Is a Human Activity, Is It Just to Disregard Animals?
- Vol. I If Ethics Was Invented for Self-Protection, Is It Just to Disadvantage Animals?
- Vol. II But Aren't Humans Capable of Suffering to a Greater Degree?
- Vol. V Questioning environmentalist assumptions
- Vol. I Attempts to Justify Speciesism That Appeal to Authorities
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