Volume VI · To Whom Do We Owe Moral Consideration? · chapter 3
Does the criterion of sentience discriminate against those who do not belong to the animal kingdom?
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
The sentience criterion isn't “kingdomism”: it doesn't include all animals (sponges probably don't feel) or exclude other kingdoms on principle; it includes any sentient being, even a non-organic one, should one come to exist.
The criterion doesn't say “care for animals.” It says “care for those who feel.” A sea sponge is an animal, but it probably doesn't feel. A robot of the future that truly felt would count too.
A shelter for “anyone who's cold” doesn't ask anyone's nationality; it asks whether the person is cold.
- P1 The charge says the criterion discriminates against those who don't belong to the animal kingdom.
- P2 The criterion includes only sentient beings, and there are animals that are probably not sentient.
- P3 It would include sentient beings of any kingdom or substrate.
- C Therefore, the sentience criterion is not the same as “belonging to the animal kingdom.”
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “Sentientism is just animalism in disguise.”
Answer Sponges and jellyfish are animals and are probably left out; digital sentient beings, if they exist, are in. The criterion is sentience, not kingdom.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VI, p. 15 of the PDF edition · English translation
The criterion of prescribes that we give to all beings that have the capacity to have experiences, such as suffering and pleasure. The criterion of sentience is sometimes accused of committing a kingdom-based discrimination, by including members of the animal kingdom in the sphere of moral consideration and excluding members of other kingdoms, such as plants and fungi.
However, proponents of the criterion of sentience do not claim that we should consider sentient beings because sentience is a characteristic of the animal kingdom. Instead, they hold that we should consider a large share of animals because they are sentient and, therefore, can be harmed and benefited.
Although every sentient being found to date belongs to the animal kingdom, there are members of the animal kingdom that, because they have no nervous system, or not even a minimally organized one, are very probably not sentient10 (such as sponges and jellyfish, for example). Proponents of the criterion of sentience do not advocate considering these animals since, according to the criterion of sentience, there is no possibility of their being harmed and/or benefited (whatever we do will make no difference to them, since there is no one there for whom things could go better or worse; there is only a living body).
If it were someday discovered that, for example, a certain plant or fungus is sentient, then the criterion of sentience would include it in the sphere of moral consideration, giving it . However, to date there is no evidence of anything like this. In the future, if sentient robots, sentient machines, sentient beings in digital media, or any other form of nonorganic sentience come to exist, the criterion of sentience would include them in the sphere of moral consideration, giving them equal consideration (since they could be harmed and/or benefited)11.
Therefore, the accusation of “kingdomism” does not hold up. The criterion of sentience is different from the criterion "belonging to the animal kingdom".
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
What examples of probably non-sentient animals does the chapter give?
Would a non-organic sentient being be included by the criterion?
Food for thought
Which beings do you include in your consideration just because they're “animals,” without asking whether they feel?
Author’s notes 2
Sources cited in this text 2
The full list for the volume is in the Volume VI references.
- TOMASIK, B. Why digital sentience is relevant to animal activists. Animal Charity Evaluators. 03 fev. 2015b.
- ÉTICA ANIMAL. Que seres não são conscientes? Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 19 out. 2015e.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
The sentience criterion discriminates on the basis of kingdoms, since it excludes those who do not belong to the animal kingdom (VI, ch. 3).
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