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Volume IV · The Debate on Animal Exploitation · chapter 6

The Claim That Consuming Animals Puts an End to Their Suffering

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Saying that consuming animals frees them from lives of suffering is an excuse: in exploitation, consumption is what causes animals to be born to suffer; and those who use it don't apply it to humans or try to reduce births.

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume IV, p. 42 of the PDF edition · English translation

6.1. Is consuming animals right because it puts an end to their suffering?

It is sometimes argued that we should consume animals out of concern for the animals themselves, on the grounds that, since the life awaiting them would be full of suffering, consuming them is doing them a favor, because it spares them that fate.

According to this position, this would apply both to animals raised to be consumed (since, as we saw in chapter 1, they are usually raised in conditions highly detrimental to their well-being111) and to those fished or hunted in the wild (since the vast majority of animals born in the wild also have lives full of suffering).

In the wild this happens mainly because the vast majority of animal species have enormous broods, with thousands or even millions of offspring depending on the species (something common in amphibians, reptiles, fish, crustaceans, and invertebrates in general), which always results in extremely low survival rates. For example, a single clutch of the common frog contains around 25,000 offspring112; that of octopuses, hundreds of thousands113; those of salmon, cod, and tuna, millions114; and that of the ocean sunfish reaches 300 million115. Land invertebrates can also lay hundreds, thousands, or even millions of eggs at a time116. In periods of roughly stable population, the rate of premature mortality can be measured from brood size: if the population has remained roughly constant over a few generations, then on average only one offspring per adult has survived (that is, two per brood, and fewer than that if there are adults who reproduce more than once in their lifetime). All the rest are generally born only to experience intense suffering and die very prematurely, often without ever having had a single positive experience117.

For these reasons, according to the position we are going to discuss, consuming animals, whether those

raised for this purpose or those captured directly in the wild, benefits them precisely by causing their deaths.

6.2. Does the fact that consuming them would end their suffering justify consuming them?

Let us begin by examining the claim that consuming animals raised for consumption benefits them because it frees them from a life full of suffering. The fact is this: if we have reasons to end their lives because those lives are full of suffering, then this gives us even stronger reasons to prevent them from being born into that situation in the first place. By consuming them, we encourage such production, causing new animals to be born into that situation. Thus, pointing out that the death of someone living a life full of suffering frees them from that suffering does not imply that raising animals for consumption is justified. Quite the contrary: it is a strong reason against .

In response, it might be objected that, in the case of animals born in the wild, ceasing to consume them does not prevent new ones from being born, and since we are in no position to choose to keep them from being born, the best we can do is to kill them (and fishing and hunting would contribute to this, for example). However, it is false that we are in no position to try to keep them from being born. For example, programs could be carried out to ensure that fewer of them are born. One example would be the administration of contraceptives and sterilization, something that is already often done118. Another example would be researching which kinds of vegetation, soil, or other components of the environment contribute to fewer births in species that maximize the number of offspring119. Another option would be researching which animals, if present, contribute indirectly to a lower total balance of suffering. For example, large herbivores such as elephants consume a great deal of vegetation that, if it were available, would contribute to more reproduction in those animal species whose vast majority are born only to suffer and die prematurely120. Thus, protecting large herbivores could

greatly reduce the total number of animals who would be born only to suffer and die prematurely121. In short, there are many things that could be done to reduce the number of animals who would be born in the wild to have lives full of suffering. Moreover, these other measures, because they attack the root of the problem, would most likely be more effective at reducing such populations than hunting or fishing.

One possible objection would be to point out that everything suggested concerns things that could be done to prevent new animals from being born to have lives full of suffering, but that, as regards those already born, consuming them benefits them because it causes them to die, freeing them from lives full of suffering.

A first problem with this objection is that, if the concern really is for the good of the animals (as the objection claims), then for animals already born in factory farming what would be advocated is, for example, direct-action activism to rescue them (since, unlike consuming them, this neither kills them nor causes new beings to be born into that system). As for animals already born in the wild, we could study how to modify the environment so that their lives are positive. This is something that could be done, for example, through studies in the field of 122. Thus, whether we are talking about animals bred to be exploited or about animals in the wild, pointing out that their lives are negative is not enough to justify killing them, since death is a benefit only if there is no other way to improve the life in question.

Furthermore, the main reason why the vast majority of animals in the wild have lives full of suffering is that they die very prematurely. If they manage to live longer, their chances of positive experiences usually increase. This is because the factors that cause them suffering usually also cause their deaths. So, by eliminating a source of suffering for an animal, we both increase the likelihood that it will have positive experiences and probably increase its lifespan123.

6.3. Conclusion

Whether with respect to animals raised to be consumed or animals captured in the wild, there are other ways of trying to help them that would not involve killing them. This alone already weakens the claim that consuming them is justified because it puts an end to lives full of suffering. In addition, these other options, unlike consuming them, would prevent other animals from being born to have lives full of suffering (or, at the very least, would not have the effect of causing more animals to be born to such a fate).

This shows that the claim that we should consume them because doing so would free them from lives full of suffering is probably just an excuse to keep consuming them, and not the real reason their consumption is defended. That is, what is claimed is concern for the animals themselves, but the real concern is probably simply one's own benefit.

Text by Luciano Carlos CunhaA Journey Through Animal Ethics collection, Volume IV
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Practice

Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.

According to the chapter, why doesn't the argument hold up in the case of exploitation?

The chapter concludes that the claim is probably...

Food for thought

If someone really wanted to reduce animals' suffering, what would they do instead of consuming them?

Author’s notes 13
  1. 111 For a detailed account of how animals raised for consumption suffer, see (2017a, p. 65-97). ↩
  2. 112 Rastogi et al. (1983). ↩
  3. 113 Boyle and Rodhouse (2005). ↩
  4. 114 Baum and Meister (1971); Hinckley (1987). ↩
  5. 115 Froese; Luna (2004). ↩
  6. 116 Brueland (1995). ↩
  7. 117 See Horta (2010b); Ética Animal (2015b); (2021, p. 55-9). For a detailed discussion of what we ought to do about this situation, see (2022). ↩
  8. 118 For an analysis of sterilization and contraceptive programs for reducing wild animal populations in Europe, see Massei (2023). ↩
  9. 119 See, for example, the study carried out by (2018). ↩
  10. 120 On the relationship between the presence of elephants and a significant reduction in available biomass, see Cumming et al. (1997) and Guldemond; VanAarde (2008). ↩
  11. 121 On elephant protection programs and how they relate to reducing the suffering of animals in the wild in general, see (2015) ↩
  12. 122 On welfare biology, see Ética Animal (2019b), et. al. (2021) and ; Horta (2022). ↩
  13. 123 For a detailed analysis of this point, see Cunha (2022, p. 259-261) ↩
Sources cited in this text 16

The full list for the volume is in the Volume IV references.

  • BAUM, E. T.; MEISTER, A. L. Fecundity of Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) from two Maine rivers. Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, v. 28, p. 764-767, 1971.
  • BOYLE, P.; RODHOUSE, P. Cephalopods: Ecology and fisheries. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.
  • BRUELAND, H. Highest lifetime fecundity. In: WALKER, T. J. (org.). University of Florida book of insect records. Gainesville: University of Florida, 1995, p. 41-43.
  • CUMMING, D. et al. Elephants, Woodlands and Biodiversity in MiomboWoodland in Southern Africa. South African Journal of Science, v. 93, 1997, p. 231-236.
  • CUNHA, L. C. Razões para ajudar: o sofrimento dos animais selvagens e suas implicações éticas. Curitiba: Appris, 2022a.
  • FROESE, R.; LUNA, S. No relationship between fecundity and annual reproductive rate in bony fish. Acta Ichthyologica et Piscatoria, v. 34, p. 11-20, 2004.
  • GULDEMOND, R. A. R.; VAN AARDE, R. J. A Meta-analysis of the Impact of African Elephants on Savanna Vegetation. Journal of Wildlife Management, v. 72, n. 4, 2008, p. 892- 899.
  • HORTA, O. Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild. Télos, v. 17, p. 73-88, 2010b.
  • HORTA, O. O que é o especismo? Ethic@, v. 21, n. 1, 162-193, 2022 [2010].
  • HORTA, O. Un paso adelante en defensa de los animales. Madrid: Plaz y Valdés, 2017a.
  • MASSEI, G. Fertility Control for Wildlife: A European Perspective. Animals v. 13 (3), n. 428, 2023.
  • PEARCE, D. A Welfare State for Elephants? A Case Study of Compassionate Stewardship. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, v. 3, n. 2, p. 153-164, 2015.
  • SORYL, A. A.; MOORE, A. J.; SEDDON, P. J.; KING, M. R. The Case for Welfare Biology. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, v. 34, n. 7, 2021.
  • TOMASIK, B. Net Primary Productivity by Land Type. Essays on Reducing Suffering, 17 jun. 2018.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Biologia do bem-estar. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 8 jul. 2019b.
  • ÉTICA ANIMAL. Dinâmica de populações e o sofrimento dos animais. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 27 out. 2015b.

This chapter in Volume XII

How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.

Death benefits them because their lives, whether in exploitation or in the wild, would be full of suffering. (IV, ch. 6).
This observation could never justify animal exploitation. On the contrary, it gives reasons to abolish it, since it produces new beings who will have lives full of suffering. Nor could it justify “letting nature take its course.” On the contrary, it gives reasons to try to prevent animals from being born in the wild in contexts in which their lives would be full of suffering.

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