The Debate on Regulating Animal Exploitation

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VIII, p. 78 of the PDF edition · English translation

11.1. Introduction

There are people who hold that, as long as animal exploitation is regulated so that the animals do not suffer (or so that they suffer less, depending on the variant), there is nothing wrong with it, even if the animals are killed.

There are at least two good reasons to reject this position. The first is that animals are also harmed by death, regardless of suffering. The second is that it is speciesist, since it sees animals as mere resources for humans, violating the principle of equal consideration and the principle of impartiality.

However, among people who recognize that animal exploitation should be abolished, there are at least two other debates that revolve around regulating animal exploitation.

• The first debate concerns whether regulating it could help gradually abolish it and, if so, whether animal advocates should advocate such regulations.
• The second debate, in turn, concerns whether regulating it could reduce the suffering of the exploited animals (regardless of whether or not it helps abolish the exploitation) and, if so, whether advocates should advocate such regulations.

Below, we will look separately at the main arguments under discussion in the two debates⁴⁵.

11.2. The debate over the causal relationship between regulation and abolition

As we have seen, the first debate involves two questions:

(1) Could regulating animal exploitation help gradually abolish it?

(2) If so, should animal advocates advocate such regulations?

We will now address each of these questions separately.

11.2.1. Could regulating animal exploitation help abolish it?

Those who hold that regulating animal exploitation could help gradually abolish it have two main arguments.

The first is that increasingly demanding regulations could make it increasingly difficult to exploit animals, and this would gradually lead to abolition, since the exploiters would see that the exploitation is not cost-effective.

The second is that, since the regulations are centered on concern for the animals' suffering, this could lead the public to increasingly recognize that animals matter in themselves, at least to some extent (or even to a great extent), which could lead the public gradually to support even the abolition of the exploitation.

The main argument of those who hold that regulating does not help gradually abolish exploitation, on the other hand, is that regulating could increase consumption, since it could make consumers feel more comfortable with their consumption because they think the animals' well-being is guaranteed. Proponents of this position generally argue that focusing on reforms can reinforce the notion that animals are resources for us to use.

11.2.2. If regulating helps abolish, should we invest in regulations?

One might think that, if it is shown that regulations gradually lead to abolition, then animal advocates should invest in regulations. However, we need to investigate whether this is the most efficient way to achieve abolition or to help animals in general. If it is, then animal advocates should certainly invest their resources in it. On the other hand, if there are one or more other, more efficient forms of activism, that is where they should invest their resources.

"More efficient" can mean several things. For example, it can mean that, with the same resources, a certain strategy reaches the intended goal sooner. Or it can mean that a certain strategy reaches the intended goal (regardless of when) while spending fewer resources. Or, again, it can mean that a certain strategy makes it harder, once the goal has been reached, to reverse it. There are several possibilities.

Accordingly, someone could argue that, even if regulations gradually lead to abolition, using the same resources to bring about changes in attitudes (for example, spreading the antispeciesist view), and/or focusing on technological changes (for example, investing in cultivated meat) and/or on behavioral changes (for example, promoting veganism or reduced consumption) could be more efficient for achieving abolition.

Thus, what is crucial for assessing this point is to compare the regulation-focused strategy with other possible strategies (and those other strategies with one another) and see which one (or ones) has the greatest potential for efficiency (bearing in mind, as we have seen, that the concept of efficiency has several aspects).

For example, it could be argued that investing the same resources in spreading an antispeciesist mindset would contribute greatly to people ceasing to consume animals, and that this would reduce the number of exploited animals more quickly than investing those resources in more regulations (even if regulations gradually led to a reduction in the number of exploited animals).

The same could be said when comparing regulations with cultivated meat technology. If cultivated meat technology arrives and becomes cheaper to produce than conventional meat, the exploiters themselves will have an interest in switching to cultivated meat. Moreover, unlike regulations, investment in cultivated meat does not carry the risk of increasing the consumption of conventional meat and, consequently, does not carry the risk of increasing the number of exploited animals (in fact, it would considerably reduce that number).

It could also be argued that, even if regulations helped gradually abolish exploitation, if people's mindset in general does not change (and they do not reject speciesism), they will probably continue to see animals as resources, and then abolition would be easily reversible once achieved. Accordingly, it could be said that the strategy of combating speciesism would be more efficient in terms of ensuring that abolition, once achieved, would not be reversed.

Moreover, it could be pointed out that the strategy of spreading an antispeciesist view has a reach that goes far beyond exploited animals, since rejecting speciesism also implies considering the animals that are victims of natural processes, who, as we saw in section 3.4, are vastly more numerous than exploited animals.

At present, there are no studies thoroughly testing the degree of efficiency of each strategy in these or other respects. The question of efficiency in activism has barely begun to be discussed. Therefore, more studies comparing the efficiency of each strategy are needed. This does not mean, however, that we should blindly trust such studies once they come to exist. Whatever a study argues in its conclusion, it is always important to evaluate its methodology because, for example, researchers may be biased depending on the activist strategy they themselves prefer.

Another important point is that, given the uncertainty about the degree of efficiency of each strategy, it is important to compensate for neglect. That is, the less a strategy has been tried so far, or the fewer people already work on it, the greater the potential for us to make a bigger positive difference if we invest in it. Investment (in terms of resources and number of people) in the strategy of regulating exploitation has been much greater over the years⁴⁶ than investment in other strategies, such as antispeciesist education, spreading veganism and reduced consumption, investing in the development of cultivated meat, etc. Thus, given the uncertainty, there are reasons to invest more in these other strategies than in regulations.

11.3. The debate over the causal relationship between regulating and reducing suffering

The second debate also involves two equivalent questions:

(1) Does regulating animal exploitation reduce the suffering of the exploited animals?

(2) If so, should animal advocates advocate such regulations?

We will now address each of these questions separately.

11.3.1. Does regulating exploitation reduce the animals' suffering?

The main argument for the idea that regulating helps reduce the suffering of exploited animals is that regulations have the force of law, so the exploiters are legally obliged to follow them, which, in theory, makes it likely that the animals will benefit.

On the other side, one counterargument is that, in practice, enforcing and monitoring these regulations may be very hard to do. This is because, in the eyes of the law, animals fall into the category of property belonging to their exploiters⁴⁷. Therefore, whenever there is a conflict between complying with certain regulations that favor the animals and the owner's interest in maximizing profit from their property, the law will almost certainly favor the owner, since property cannot have rights (and the exploiters have the right to exploit their property)⁴⁸.

Moreover, even if the law obliges the exploiter to follow a regulation, it is extremely difficult to monitor whether the regulation is being complied with, all the more so given the enormous demand for animal products. For example, the law already requires that an animal be stunned before being killed, but since slaughterhouse lines must move at extremely high speed because of high demand, it is quite common for animals not to be fully stunned and then to be dismembered, sliced up, skinned, or boiled while still fully conscious⁴⁹.

To illustrate the difficulty of enforcement and monitoring, let us look at an example involving decapod crustaceans. An official UK government report, published in November 2021, recommended that all cephalopod mollusks and decapod crustaceans be recognized as sentient beings and that they should therefore be protected by the United Kingdom's

animal welfare laws.

Two years after the official report was published, Crustacean Compassion carried out a survey aimed at finding out how the official report's recommendation was being applied, taking as its basis the law The Welfare at Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 (known as WATOK), which prescribes that an animal must not be killed in a way that causes avoidable pain, distress, or suffering, and that anyone who kills an animal must have the knowledge and skills necessary to do so.

The survey was sent to departments in all 32 London boroughs. The result was that 25 boroughs did not respond, and among those that did, many did not recognize that they had responsibility for enforcing this law. Moreover, the boroughs of Kensington and Chelsea claimed that decapods are not covered by animal welfare laws, which is not true. The only borough up to date with the report, Hammersmith and Fulham, has only eight staff members on its Food Safety Team, and acknowledged that its Animal Welfare Charter “needs further review,” since it did not yet include decapods. At the time of the survey, two years had already passed since the government report was published.

Moreover, although WATOK prescribes that "anyone who kills an animal must have the knowledge and skills necessary to do so," buying live decapod crustaceans to kill at home is still permitted in London. The Crustacean Compassion report notes that it is highly unlikely that a consumer who buys a live crab or a live lobster at one of London's markets will be able to kill them at home in a way that does not cause suffering, especially since it can take 4 to 8 minutes for a lobster to die when boiled alive, which is the common way of killing them.

In response to this problem, it is sometimes said that regulation would nonetheless help prevent animal suffering because, even with this difficulty of monitoring, the fact that there is a law requiring certain procedures allows a company to be sued for noncompliance. However, although this possibility works in favor of those who seek to defend animals, this response thereby acknowledges that there is not necessarily a causal relationship between, on the one hand, a regulation being passed and, on the other, the animals' suffering actually being reduced.

Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that, in the context of laws regulating animal exploitation, terms such as "cruel treatment," "unnecessary suffering," and "inhumane treatment" are usually defined very differently from how they are used in ordinary language⁵⁰.

For example, in these regulations, for treatment to be considered cruel there generally has to be proof that the agent took pleasure in causing suffering (since cruelty is a mental state)⁵¹. However, animal exploiters can simply claim that they were not taking pleasure in the practices that cause suffering, and that their only goal was to maximize profit from their property or to conduct scientific research, for example. Thus, contrary to what the public usually thinks, in these laws "cruel" is not defined in terms of the consequences for the victim, but in terms of the agent's mental state. Since someone's mental state is very hard to prove, laws that prohibit cruelty rarely result, in practice, in any punishment⁵².

One might think that the same does not happen with the term "inhumane treatment" and that it is, then, defined in terms of the harm to the victim. However, in laws regulating animal exploitation, "inhumane treatment" is usually defined as any treatment that is not common human practice in that field⁵³. So any procedure that causes extreme pain will not be considered inhumane treatment as long as it is common practice among the exploiters in that field. Thus, these laws usually prohibit only very unusual cases of harm to animals⁵⁴.

The same happens with the expression "unnecessary suffering," which these regulations usually define as suffering that is not necessary for the owner to achieve the end they seek⁵⁵. Thus, if the owner shows that the suffering their practice caused was necessary to achieve the end they seek (for example, maximizing the profits from their production), the law will consider it necessary suffering, even if it causes extreme suffering and even if the activity itself is in no way necessary⁵⁶.

11.3.2. If regulating reduces suffering, should we invest in regulations?

In the previous section we saw that there are reasons for reasonable doubt about whether regulations, once passed, actually result in a reduction in the suffering of exploited animals. However, let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that they do in fact considerably reduce the suffering of exploited animals. One might think that this automatically implies that, if our goal is to benefit animals, we must necessarily invest in regulations. However, there are other factors to consider.

The first factor is the same one mentioned earlier: we need to investigate whether or not there are other strategies that are more efficient in terms of benefiting animals. If there are, then we should invest in those other strategies. If there are not, then we should invest in regulations. For example, it could be said that trying to regulate would involve a large expenditure of resources (time, money, people, etc.) that could be used in another, more efficient way.

The second factor is the following possibility: suppose that regulations reduce the suffering of exploited animals, but make the public feel more comfortable consuming animals, and this results in an increase in demand for animal products. If regulation has the effect of increasing the number of exploited animals by increasing consumption, it is then already uncertain whether its overall balance is more positive than not trying to regulate. To assess this, one would have to weigh the value of reducing the suffering of the animals who would be exploited against the disvalue of bringing more animals into existence to be exploited. This is a question that is crucially about commensurability in value theory. Therefore, it is not a question that could be settled by scientific research.

11.4. Several additional points of discussion

In addition to the points we discussed in the previous sections, there are several additional points of discussion that are important for answering the questions we have addressed so far. In the next sections we will look at the main arguments under discussion regarding these additional points.

11.4.1. Do reforms increase the costs of exploitation?

Advocates of reforms argue that they increase costs for producers, which probably weakens the industry and, as a knock-on effect, reduces the consumption of animal products, since their prices tend to rise⁵⁷. Along the same lines, it is argued that, if reforms increased profits, the industry would adopt them without pressure from activists⁵⁸.

However, one could reply that, if the exploiters accept the reforms, although this may initially increase costs, it is also possible that over time it will increase profits, owing to increased consumption driven by labels such as "happy meat" and the like, which would tend to improve the company's public image, even though the animals continue to suffer immensely.

Another possible reply is to point out that, if the exploiters' resistance is a problem for getting reforms implemented, then it is more efficient for activists to invest in supporting the development, cost reduction, and implementation of cultivated meat, since, if it comes to be cheaper to produce than conventional meat, it would not face the same resistance that the exploiters have toward reforms (in fact, they themselves would seek to implement it, since it would be more profitable for them).

11.4.2. Do reforms make later changes easier?

One argument sometimes put forward to hold that reforms do not make later changes easier is to point out that companies may become more resistant to new reforms after having already implemented some, especially if the reforms already implemented significantly improve their image and cost them little.

One reply to this argument is to point out that, in several countries in 2015 and 2016, new reforms followed one another in quick succession. For example, soon after the transition to cage-free policies, commitments to end the practice of killing chicks were accepted⁵⁹.

A counterargument to this observation is to point out that it applies more strongly to facilitating new reforms than to reducing the number of exploited animals.

Another concern about reforms making later changes harder is that the animal exploitation industry can influence and neutralize animal advocacy organizations through the partnerships that activists build with the industry, especially if there is financial investment or donations from the industry to animal advocacy organizations⁶⁰.

11.4.3. Do reforms make reducing consumption easier or harder?

One argument for the claim that reforms make reducing consumption easier is that, when a reform takes place, people see that their culture includes some concern for animals, and this could then influence them to incorporate that concern and later feel more outraged when they find out that the animals still suffer tremendously, even with the regulations on so-called humane treatment⁶¹.

An argument in the opposite direction is that reforms may make people more inclined to consume more animal products and to defend animal exploitation, pointing out that "now the animals live good lives." For example, in a 2017 survey, 75% of American adults said that the animal products they buy come from humanely treated animals, even though more than 99% of the animals exploited in the US are raised on factory farms⁶².

This argument is sometimes answered by pointing out that countries that have had more reforms in exploitation also tend to have higher rates of adherence to vegetarianism⁶³. However, one could reply that this does not show that it is the reforms that make reducing consumption easier. The opposite may very well be the case (there being more reforms in these countries because they already had more people concerned about the animals exploited for consumption), or the reduction in consumption may be influenced by variables other than the reforms.

Another argument in defense of reforms points out that media coverage of reforms tends to focus more on the problems that still remain and the progress yet to come than on how things are better now or on consumption being less worrying⁶⁴. However, one could reply that this does not necessarily cause a reduction in consumption. For example, during the period leading up to the vote on a reform in California in 2008, there was no decrease in egg consumption associated with the increase in media coverage, although demand for eggs from hens exploited outside cages tended to increase and demand for eggs from hens confined in cages tended to decrease⁶⁵.

Another argument for the claim that reforms make reducing consumption easier is that studies have found that respondents who read about reforms focused on animal welfare were more likely to say they would reduce their consumption of animal products than a control group that read about policy changes unrelated to animals⁶⁶.

11.4.4. Are reforms the best gradual steps toward change?

Reforms are often defended on the grounds that they offer gradual steps toward abolition. Proponents of reforms sometimes accuse their opponents of harboring the illusion that abolition will be achieved overnight⁶⁷.

However, opponents of reforms could reply that they know very well that abolition will not be achieved overnight, but that the best gradual steps toward achieving abolition are not reforms but other strategies (such as spreading an antispeciesist view, encouraging cultivated meat, veganism, reduced consumption, etc.)

Thus, there are two questions under discussion here. The first is: do reforms offer gradual steps toward abolition? The second is: even if they do, are there other, more efficient gradual steps (toward abolition and/or toward a general change in the situation of animals)?

In defense of the claim that reforms offer gradual steps toward abolition, parallels with the struggle to end human slavery are sometimes cited. For example, the British antislavery movement first sought to abolish the transatlantic slave trade (since that was easier to achieve than total abolition), and once it succeeded, it turned its focus to eliminating slavery in the West Indies, and so on⁶⁸.

In response to these parallels, one could reply that perhaps the success of the antislavery movement depended on campaigns that are very different from what proponents of reforms in animal exploitation advocate. For example, it is possible that the success of the antislavery movement depended crucially on its advocates making clear that each action was a step toward abolition, something that generally does not happen in campaigns for reforms in animal exploitation⁶⁹.

It could also be pointed out that, in the case of the parallels cited regarding the antislavery movement, the gradual steps toward abolition were abolitions of specific practices of slavery, not regulations of existing practices. For example, eliminating the slave trade in certain regions is a step toward abolition, but a law regulating the number of lashes permitted on slaves would not be.

Another argument sometimes put forward to hold that reforms facilitate abolition points out that, if the industry opposes the reforms, the public may come to agree that the only way to solve the problem is through abolition⁷⁰. However, one reply to this argument is to point out that this will only happen if a good portion of the public is seriously concerned about animals, which shows that reforms, by themselves, do not lead to abolition (since, for there to be a movement for abolition, an increase in consideration for nonhuman animals in society is necessary).

11.4.5. The possibility of biases on both sides

Proponents of reforms sometimes argue that some activists may be biased in thinking that reforms facilitate the acceptance of exploitation, owing to the desire for

change to happen quickly and the resulting frustration at the slowness of change⁷¹. Another argument that could be put forward along the same lines would be to point out that recognizing that animal exploitation is unjust and should be abolished could compel people to claim that reforms are not effective in abolishing it (they would do so to avoid the discomfort that would arise from admitting that reforms in exploitation could be something good). Finally, proponents of reforms often cite the fact that there is majority agreement among researchers in the effective altruism movement that regulations hinder animal exploitation more than they facilitate it⁷².

However, there are also biases that may influence people to take a pro-reform position. For example, because of commitment bias, researchers who have been involved for a long time in supporting reforms may see them as more positive than they really are (although commitment bias may also affect the opposite view, if someone has already invested a great deal in a position opposed to reforms). Moreover, because of the bandwagon effect, the fact that most researchers are pro-reform may incline other researchers to favor reforms too, without necessarily assessing their effectiveness thoroughly. Another possibility is that the desire to see a more immediate and measurable impact (something that is possible with reforms) may lead someone to believe that reforms are more efficient than they really are.

In short, it is possible that various biases influence the perception of both sides. It is important to keep this in mind when evaluating not only this question of reforms, but activist strategies in general.

For example, motivated reasoning leads us to try to confirm the beliefs we already held, rather than trying to discover the truth, thus producing a confirmation bias, which consists in noticing (or giving greater weight to) information that confirms our initial belief and in failing to notice (or giving less weight to) information that shows it to be mistaken. Another effect of motivated reasoning and confirmation bias is that people evaluate arguments that confirm their initial beliefs much less rigorously. That is, these biases make people very critical of the positions they disagree with, but not at all critical of their own positions.

Related to all this is the take-the-best heuristic. When we use this heuristic, instead of considering all the reasons why we might choose one alternative over another, we pick any one reason and base our decision exclusively on it. A classic example is the tendency to think that pointing out a single negative effect of a strategy one is initially unsympathetic to is enough to show that we should not adopt it. Analogously, another example is the tendency to think that pointing out a single positive effect of a strategy one is initially sympathetic to is enough to show that we should adopt it. Both attitudes are biased, since they do not take into account all the probable positive and negative effects of each strategy.

11.5. Conclusion

There are four main questions in the debate on reforms in animal exploitation. (1) Do they contribute toward abolition? (2) If they do, should animal advocates invest in reforms? (3) Do they really reduce the suffering of exploited animals? (4) If they do, should animal advocates invest in reforms?

We have seen that there is great controversy regarding questions 1 and 3. Moreover, questions 2 and 4 depend crucially on whether or not there are other strategies with greater potential for efficiency than reforms. We have seen that one difficulty in this regard is that there are no very precise data on the efficiency of other strategies, since far fewer resources have been invested in them so far. Examples of these other strategies are antispeciesist education, investment in cultivated meat, and campaigns encouraging veganism and/or reduced consumption. This, then, is a reason to invest more in such strategies than in reforms, given that far more resources are already invested in reforms and a far larger number of activists are working on them. Thus, our marginal impact will be greater if we focus more on these other strategies.

We have also seen that there are several difficulties with reforms, such as the risk of increased consumption (and therefore of an increase in the number of exploited animals), the resistance put up by the exploiters, and the difficulty of implementation and monitoring, even when reforms are passed. There is at least one other strategy that would avoid these problems: investing the resources that would be invested in reforms in research on cultivated meat (whether these are resources from the animal cause or resources from the exploiters).

Cultivated meat would not carry the risk of increasing the consumption of animals since, the more cultivated meat was consumed, the smaller the number of exploited animals (compared to standard consumption). Moreover, the proposal to invest in cultivated meat would probably not meet the same resistance that the exploiters have toward reforms, since if the exploiters realize that cultivated meat has the potential to become cheaper to produce than conventional meat, they themselves would invest in it.

Thus, instead of investing resources in campaigns for reforms, animal activists could demand legislation requiring every company that exploits animals to invest an amount "x" of its resources in research on cultivated meat, for example.

The example above compared the strategy of investing in reforms with the strategy of investing in cultivated meat. However, it is also possible to compare it with other strategies, such as antispeciesist education and encouraging veganism or reduced consumption (and also to compare all these other strategies with one another). This is something we inevitably have to do if our goal is really to have the best impact for animals.