Why the Term Welfarism Is Highly Ambiguous

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VIII, p. 75 of the PDF edition · English translation

10.1. Introduction

The term welfarism is highly ambiguous, since it is used to refer to positions that differ greatly from one another and that concern different debates. As we will see below, the term has at least seven meanings. This ambiguity often gives rise to the mistaken belief that accepting/rejecting a given position called welfarist means having to accept/reject other positions that go by the same name. As we will see, there is no such implication, since these positions concern different matters.

Below, I will explain the various positions that are usually called welfarist in different questions, and I will suggest substitute terms to avoid confusion.

10.2. Several positions called welfarist

The adjective welfarist is usually used to refer to the following positions:

(1) The position that holds that, as long as animal exploitation is regulated so that the animals do not suffer (or suffer less, depending on the variant), it becomes just.

Suggested substitute: RMJ position (in the sense of "regulating makes it just").

The main criticisms of this position are that it: (1) fails to take into account the harm of death for animals; (2) violates the principle of equal consideration; and (3) fails the impartiality test.

(2) The position that holds that, even if animal exploitation is regulated so that the animals do not suffer, it remains unjust and should be abolished, but that we should regulate it because doing so will gradually help abolish it.

Suggested substitute: RHA position (in the sense of "regulating helps abolish").

(3) The position that holds that, even if animal exploitation is regulated so that the animals do not suffer, it remains unjust and should be abolished, and that regulating it will not necessarily help gradually abolish it, but that we should try to regulate it because doing so will reduce the suffering of the exploited animals.

Suggested substitute: RRS position (in the sense of "regulating reduces suffering").

(4) Any and every position that aims to improve the well-being of animals, including animals that are not exploited by humans. For example, the proposal to help wild animals that are victims of natural processes is sometimes called welfarist in this sense, because its goal is concern for the animals' own good (rather than environmentalist values, centered on nonsentient entities), that is, because it is centered on beings that have well-being rather than on nonsentient entities. Work to protect abandoned animals is also sometimes called this.

Suggested substitute: Proposals aimed at the good of animals

(5) Positions that hold that what has value in itself is well-being (that is, the way sentient beings are affected positively or negatively), and not the way nonsentient entities (such as species, ecosystems, and nonsentient living organisms) are affected. In other words, in this sense the term refers to sentience-centered positions.

The main argument for the sentience criterion is the argument from relevance.

Suggested substitute: Sentience-centered positions

(6) Positions that hold that, in order to judge whether a situation involving several sentient beings has become worse/better in some respect, some sentient being must have had their well-being worsened/improved.

This is a debate that takes place in normative ethics, for example, between prioritarian positions and egalitarian positions. For example, let us compare situation S1, where A=+15, B=+14, with S2, where A=+14, B=+14. According to prioritarianism, S2 is not better in any respect, since there is no one who is better off compared to S1 (in fact, there is only someone who is worse off). Therefore, prioritarianism would be welfarist in this sense of the term. Egalitarians, by contrast, would say that S2 is better in at least one respect: in it, the total value is better distributed among individuals, even though S1 may be better all things considered (that is, taking into account everything that matters). This other text discusses this question in more detail.

Suggested substitute: Positions centered on changes in levels of well-being

(7) Theories about what the well-being of sentient beings consists of (which are called theories of well-being). There are several theories of this kind. However, all of them concern every circumstance in which a sentient being would be benefited or harmed. Thus, both a view that holds that the only form of harm is suffering and a view that holds that sentient beings can also be harmed in other ways (for example, by death, by being deprived of other positive events, by the frustration of desires, by being deprived of objective goods, etc.) are based on some theory of what their well-being consists of (that is, a theory about what harms or benefits individuals).

Suggested substitute: Theories of benefit/harm.

10.3. Conclusion

As should now be clear, since each of these terms concerns a different debate, accepting/rejecting any one of these positions does not necessarily imply accepting/rejecting any of the others that are referred to by the same name.