The Debate on Cultivated Meat

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VIII, p. 93 of the PDF edition · English translation

12.1. Introduction

In this chapter we will first look at what cultivated meat technology is and then address three debates about this technology. The first debate discusses the objections put forward by those who defend conventional meat. The second, the objections put forward by animal advocates. Finally, the third discusses the advantages and disadvantages of cultivated meat compared to other strategies for changing the situation of animals.

12.2. What cultivated meat is

Cultivated meat is also known as cell-based meat, synthetic meat, in vitro meat, clean meat, artificial meat, or lab-grown meat. It is meat obtained by culturing animal cells. The cells are generally obtained by biopsy from animals and are then cultured, resulting in structures similar to the muscle tissues found in animal meat⁷³. In the final stage, the process involves shaping, seasoning, and coloring, and the result is a final product with the same appearance, flavor, and texture as conventional meat⁷⁴.

The production of cultivated meat usually involves extracting cells from a nonhuman animal (living or dead) by means of a tissue biopsy⁷⁵. The cells of interest are then isolated and placed in a bioreactor, where they are expanded to create a greater cell yield, and are afterward placed on a scaffold to mature into a specific form⁷⁶. To expand the cells in the bioreactor, a cell culture medium with a nutrient-rich solution is used. In some cases this solution contains fetal bovine serum (FBS), produced from blood drawn from a dead cow fetus. However, the cultivated meat industry is moving from FBS to plant-based serums⁷⁷.

The main cells used are skeletal muscle myocytes, adipocytes (fat cells), and fibroblasts (connective tissue)⁷⁸. The samples include differentiated cells and stem cells. Both types are primary cells and exhibit limited proliferation once removed, unlike what happens in immortalized cell lines (which, owing to a chance or induced mutation, evade the natural mechanisms of cellular senescence and can keep dividing practically indefinitely⁷⁹).

Embryonic stem cells, being pluripotent, are a good option for the cultivated meat process⁸⁰. But since they are difficult to obtain and to differentiate efficiently into the desired cell lines, a more viable alternative is adult stem cells, since they are found in a variety of tissues, although they have a more limited capacity for differentiation⁸¹.

Cultivated meat is not limited to the production of beef. There is already considerable work on cultivated meat from birds⁸², pigs⁸³, fish⁸⁴, decapod crustaceans such as shrimp and lobsters⁸⁵, and even for the production of dairy products⁸⁶. In theory, it is possible to produce cultivated meat from any animal, including humans⁸⁷.

12.3. Potential for acceptance/rejection of cultivated meat

Cultivated meat is already available for human consumption in Singapore, the US, and Israel, and has been approved in the United Kingdom as food for animals such as dogs and cats⁸⁸.

The cultivated meat industry has the potential to grow enormously. For example, one survey found that 70% of the UK population is willing to buy cultivated

meat⁸⁹. Another example is the fact that large conventional meat companies, such as Cargill and Tyson, have invested heavily in cultivated meat⁹⁰.

However, cultivated meat also faces rejection. For example, in November 2023 Italy banned cultivated meat outright, preventing it from being developed or sold in the country⁹¹.

12.4. Discussing the main objections to cultivated meat

The great advantage of cultivated meat technology, in terms of avoiding harm to animals, is that it provides a product practically identical to conventional meat, but (depending on the method) without the need to kill animals or subject them to the extremes of suffering to which they are typically subjected when they are exploited for food.

However, cultivated meat also faces objections. In the next sections we will discuss some of the most frequent ones. In sections 5 to 8 we will discuss objections that are not focused on concern for animals. In sections 9 to 14 we will discuss objections focused on concern for animals.

12.5. The objection that it is not natural

A first objection to cultivated meat accuses it of not being natural. This objection is usually raised in defense of conventional meat. This was, for example, one of the central reasons for the ban on cultivated meat in Italy.

A first possible reply to this objection is to maintain that cultivated meat is in fact natural, since it is made of cells just like conventional meat. Moreover, it is obtained by growing cells, without involving any genetic modification of them. However, one could respond that what is meant when it is claimed that cultivated meat is not natural is that it goes through several procedures before resulting in the final product, and all of these procedures involve the use of technology. Yet to this one could reply that

conventional meat likewise goes through a series of procedures that also involve the use of technology.

A second way of replying (the correct way, in my view) is to point out that, even if cultivated meat is not natural and conventional meat is, this does not imply that we should reject cultivated meat, nor that conventional meat is justified. After all, just as the fact that something is natural does not imply that it is necessarily good⁹², the fact that something is not natural does not imply that it is necessarily bad. For example, suppose it were shown that conventional meat is natural and cultivated meat is not. If bringing about less suffering and fewer deaths in the world is more important than obtaining a natural product, we will in that case have to reject the natural product.

At this point some people might claim that obtaining a natural product is more important than avoiding suffering and deaths. However, this position is very likely speciesist or, at the very least, selfish. For example, if humans were being bred and killed for their meat, and we ourselves had to face that fate, no one would object to cultivated meat on the grounds that it is not natural. This shows that the position holding that obtaining a natural product is more important than avoiding suffering and deaths fails the impartiality test and therefore cannot be just⁹³.

12.6. The objection that it would pose risks to consumers

Another objection claims that the problem with cell-based meat is that it could have unforeseen negative effects on those who consume it. For example, Wrenn (2024, p.8) claims that animal protein is toxic to humans and that the normalization of in vitro meat will worsen serious diet-related public health crises, disproportionately harming vulnerable human communities that lack the resources and infrastructure to cope with them⁹⁴. The author (2024, p.8) concludes that "vegans should not promote toxic products, especially when healthier and more accessible alternatives are available," referring to plant-based food.

There are at least two possible replies to this objection, discussed below.

The first reply involves noting that cultivated meat is intended as an alternative to conventional meat, not to the consumption of plants. Thus, to assess the claim that its normalization will worsen serious public health crises, what has to be compared is not a scenario in which x number of people consume cultivated meat with a scenario in which they would eat only plants, but rather a scenario in which x number of people consume cultivated meat with a scenario in which they would consume conventional meat.

Cultivated meat is no less safe for consumers' health than conventional meat. In fact, it is much safer, since cultivated meat facilities have a high degree of control over the environment, so the chances of contamination with pathogens such as salmonella and E. coli are quite limited⁹⁵. Although it is always possible for cultivated meat to be contaminated in other ways (as happens with any food, including plants), this risk is many times smaller than it is in the case of conventional meat⁹⁶.

Moreover, since cultivated meat production does not house live animals and hygiene standards are high, it could do a great deal to reduce the frequency of zoonotic disease outbreaks⁹⁷ and also to reduce antibiotic resistance⁹⁸. If left unchecked, antibiotic resistance threatens to make simple infections fatal once again⁹⁹. The main driver of antibiotic resistance is animal agriculture, owing to the enormous quantity of antibiotics routinely administered to exploited animals¹⁰⁰. Although cultivated meat also uses antibiotics to reduce the risk of contamination, research in the field suggests that in the future antibiotics will no longer be routinely used in cultivated meat production¹⁰¹.

The second reply, in turn, points out that, even if cultivated meat were less safe for consumers than conventional meat, the risk consumers would run does not come anywhere close to the harms animals endure when they are exploited.

For example, conventional meat results in a gigantic number of animal deaths, and results in most of them having lives full of suffering. Moreover, this harm is certain (and not merely a risk), and the animals are forced into that fate. On the other side, even if every person who consumed cultivated meat suffered some kind of harm, the number of victims would still be vastly smaller than the number of victims of animal exploitation, and the harm per victim would still be vastly smaller than the harm to each exploited animal (at least compared to the suffering to which animals exploited in factory farming are subjected). Moreover, in the case of consumers, this would be a risk (and not a certain harm, as it is for the animals), and a risk they would choose to run of their own accord, since they are not obliged to consume it (they can, for example, eat only plant-based food), unlike the animals.

In short, the fact that a practice involves a risk, or even an actual harm to humans, does not imply that we have conclusive reasons to reject it. The risks and harms to everyone affected (including nonhuman animals) in each of the available courses of action would have to be weighed in an unbiased way. We saw above that cultivated meat is probably safer than conventional meat. But even if it were less safe, once we take into account the harms to each of the affected parties (human and nonhuman), comparing conventional meat and cultivated meat, the balance would still tip in favor of cultivated meat.

12.7. The objection that it is not yet sustainable

Another objection accuses cultivated meat of not being a sustainable technology, since it would use far more resources to produce the equivalent amount of food compared to the production of plant foods. We will now discuss three possible replies to this objection.

The first reply points out that, since cultivated meat is a very recent technology, it is likely that, if more resources are invested in it, over time it will become increasingly cheap to produce, perhaps even to the point of coming to use fewer resources in the future to produce the equivalent amount of food, even compared to the production of plant foods. It is uncertain whether this would actually happen. But it is something we could only know if the same amount of resources were invested in both forms of food production over the same period of time.

The second reply, in turn, points out that cultivated meat aims to be an alternative to conventional meat (not an alternative to a plant-based diet), and that, even if it makes sense to say that growing plants is more sustainable than cultivated meat, it does not make sense to say that conventional meat is more sustainable than cultivated meat.

For example, compared to conventional meat, cultivated meat facilities require much less land and water and are responsible for fewer greenhouse gas emissions¹⁰², requiring 64% to 90% less land and causing 20% to 94% less air pollution¹⁰³.

Finally, the third reply points out that, to know whether we should invest in technology A or B, it is not enough to know which of the two is more sustainable: what we need to know is which of them is better taking into account all the sentient beings affected. Thus, even if cultivated meat were less sustainable than conventional meat, the fact that cultivated meat avoids the death and suffering of trillions of individuals would show that it would still be preferable to conventional meat, even if it were less sustainable.

12.8. The objection that it harms the most vulnerable humans

Another objection to cultivated meat is the claim that it harms disadvantaged humans because of the technology's potential to be exploited for profit in capitalist societies.

For example, Wrenn (2024, p.8) opposes cultivated meat, claiming that "the effort to globalize diets rich in animal protein is rooted in colonialism, racism, and classism," and argues (referring to plant-based food) that "healthier and more

accessible alternatives are available and already existed before Western capitalism began privatizing land and undermining traditional food production around the world"¹⁰⁴. The author concludes that, because of this, "in vitro meat may be palatable to venture capitalists, but it is unlikely to create meaningful social change for nonhuman animals"¹⁰⁵.

A first possible reply to this objection is to point out that capitalists will seek to maximize their profits in any case, and so it is preferable that they do so using cultivated meat rather than conventional meat, since this would greatly reduce the amount of suffering and death caused to animals. Therefore, it is not true that cultivated meat would not create meaningful change for nonhuman animals. In fact, the changes would probably be extremely significant.

This also shows that it is false that cultivated meat would increase the inequality resulting from capitalism (since companies would seek to maximize profits in any case, whether with cultivated meat, with conventional meat, or with plant production). The difference would be that cultivated meat would result in a world with less total suffering and fewer total deaths compared to a world with conventional meat.

A second reply is to point out that, even if cultivated meat increased the inequality resulting from capitalism, it does not follow that there would be conclusive reasons to reject it. The fact that it has the potential to considerably reduce the total amount of suffering and death of nonhuman animals would have to be taken into account. Weighing the harms and benefits to everyone affected, it would still have a far more positive balance than conventional meat, even if it increased inequality among humans.

An objection to this reply would be to say that, in that case, what we should advocate is a plant-based diet, since it would involve even less suffering and death than cultivated meat. Again, this could be answered in two ways, discussed below.

The first is to point out that, if cultivated meat comes to be developed, perhaps in the future it will involve less animal suffering and death than even growing plants, since plant production also causes suffering and death to a large number of small animals who live in the fields (through the use of pesticides, harvesting methods, etc.).

The second reply is to point out that it is very unlikely that animal exploiters would agree to switch to plant production, but it is quite likely that they would switch to cultivated meat if it turns out to be more profitable than conventional meat. Thus, if a campaign against cultivated meat were successful, the result would not be animal exploiters switching to plant production, but rather maintaining the production of conventional meat. Therefore, there is no reason for animal advocates to be against cultivated meat, even if they believe there are better options than it.

12.9. The objection that the producers do not care about animals

Some people oppose cultivated meat on the grounds that it is produced by large companies that are driven by profit and do not care about animals¹⁰⁶.

A first possible reply to this objection is to point out that the people who own cultivated meat companies, who work at such companies, or who invest in them are, in their vast majority, vegans or vegetarians¹⁰⁷.

A second reply is to point out that whether cultivated meat companies care about helping animals is irrelevant: what is relevant is the impact on animals¹⁰⁸. For example, Bryant (2024, p. 10) argues that we should prefer a company that does not care about animals but reduces harm to animals over a company that cares about animals but lacks the capacity to do anything about it¹⁰⁹.

12.10. The objection that cultivated meat does not solve every problem

Cultivated meat is sometimes rejected on the grounds that it "is not a panacea for the horrors of animal use and exploitation¹¹⁰," since it "will not benefit animals raised for the production of dairy, eggs, wool, leather, experimentation, or entertainment"¹¹¹.

A first possible reply to this objection is to point out that, if cultivated meat technology comes to be developed, it may also come to replace these other products or practices that currently use animals. For example, as we have seen, there are already dairy companies that use cultivated meat technology¹¹².

A second reply is to point out that what needs to be assessed is not whether cultivated meat solves all the problems of animals, but whether it is efficient at solving the problem it sets out to solve. After all, other initiatives that benefit animals, such as alternatives to the use of animals in science, the adoption of abandoned animals, and attempts to ban specific practices of exploitation, are not rejected because they do not solve the problems of all animals. If the fact that a form of activism does not cover every problem affecting animals meant that we should reject it, then veganism or any other form of activism focused on exploited animals would also have to be rejected, since they do not address the issue of animals who suffer in the wild as a result of natural processes¹¹³ or the problems related to the future¹¹⁴, for example.

12.11. The objection that the impact may be smaller than expected

Another objection to cultivated meat points out that there is currently no certainty about whether it might one day grow to the point of largely replacing conventional meat and actually leading to far fewer animals being used in the food system¹¹⁵.

It is true that there is no such certainty. However, this is not enough for us to conclude that it is not worth investing in this technology. What would have to be assessed is whether the potential benefit

justifies the investment, and whether or not there is some other, more promising form of investment, in terms of benefiting animals, in which the same resources could be invested. Pointing out that there is no certainty about whether it might one day come to largely replace conventional meat does not answer these questions, not least because whether or not this will actually happen depends on how much is invested in cultivated meat, compared to investment in conventional meat.

Moreover, the investment that large conventional meat companies make in cultivated meat has already been growing. Thus, if animal advocates campaign against cultivated meat, the most they can achieve is that these companies invest in conventional meat the resources they could have invested in cultivated meat, and the result will then be that cultivated meat will not come to replace conventional meat.

12.12. The objection that cultivated meat is still of animal origin

Some animal advocates object to cultivated meat on the grounds that, since it is a product made with animal cells, it would not be a vegan product.

One reply to this objection is to point out that the concept of veganism concerns avoiding harm to animals, and so what matters is knowing the impact cultivated meat will have on animals. For example, suppose that cell-based meat did not harm animals in any way. In that case, given the definition of veganism as the practice of avoiding harm to animals, cell-based meat would be vegan (even if it were made with animal cells).

However, it could be objected that the adjective vegan cannot be applied to a food of animal origin, even if it did not harm animals in any way. Yet in that case one could reply that whether or not the food is vegan then does not matter for knowing whether we should support it or reject it: what matters is knowing its impact on animals.

Accordingly, it seems crucial to know whether cultivated meat harms animals in any way and, if so, whether that harm is sufficient for us to reject it, or whether its potential benefit to animals could outweigh that harm. That is what we will discuss next.

12.13. The objection that cultivated meat still harms animals

One of the main objections of animal advocates to cultivated meat is the fact that, at least at present, it requires taking cells from animals, and therefore some animals would have to be kept as a source of cells¹¹⁶.

Moreover, it is also pointed out that most of the existing literature on the subject, whether in academic publications or on the websites of cultivated meat companies, does not describe what happens to the animals during the cell extraction procedure, nor what happens to the animal after the biopsy¹¹⁷. Some authors claim that, presumably, they share the same fate as most other farmed animals, that is, they are killed¹¹⁸. However, there are companies that state that the animals they use are not killed¹¹⁹.

An advocate of cultivated meat could reply by pointing out that, even if this is a harm to these animals, it does not come anywhere close to the harm they would endure with conventional meat, where, besides being killed, they would probably have a life full of intense suffering. It would still be true that cultivated meat could radically reduce the number of animals who suffer and die in animal agriculture¹²⁰.

To this, the opponent of cultivated meat could reply that we should reject both conventional meat and cultivated meat because both use animals as resources. According to this reply, what we should do is advocate veganism. For example, the Vegan Society's policy on cultivated meat states the following:

“As it currently stands, the cultivated meat process is not sufficient for us to support it. [...] There is already a plethora of vegan meat alternatives that are not derived from cultivated or lab-grown meats¹²¹.

In short, what proponents of this argument mean is that showing that cultivated meat is better than conventional meat is not enough to justify it, since there is an even better option: veganism.

The advocate of cultivated meat could reply to this in two ways. The first would be to point out that at present it is necessary to use animals to obtain the cells, but perhaps in the future some procedure will make it possible to obtain cells indefinitely, such as the use of immortalized cell lines or cloning, for example.

The second reply points out that there is no realistic possibility of persuading animal exploiters to switch to producing plant-based food (since the demand for meat would continue), but there is a realistic possibility that, if cultivated meat technology turns out to be more profitable for them, they will switch to cultivated meat.

Accordingly, the advocate of cultivated meat could point out that, if someone is going to cause harm, it is obviously preferable that they cause a lesser harm. Since in this case conventional meat would cause an overwhelmingly greater harm, it is important to advocate cultivated meat. Thus, the advocate of cultivated meat could accuse its opponents of not knowing how to deal with trade- offs (losses and gains). The result of someone refusing to advocate cultivated meat on the grounds that it would still cause some harm to animals would probably be that animals continue to be exploited in the worst possible ways, since animal exploiters have an extremely low probability of adopting veganism but a good probability of adopting cultivated meat production if it turns out to be more profitable for them.

At this point some opponents of cultivated meat argue that they bear no responsibility whatsoever for what will happen, since that will depend on the exploiters' decisions, not theirs. However, if we can influence someone's decision, it seems that we are at least partially responsible for what will happen, whether we decide to exert influence or decide not to. For example, let us imagine that, left to himself, an animal exploiter will adopt neither cultivated meat nor veganism. Let us imagine, however, that the probability of our persuading him to stop using animals is very low, but that the probability of our persuading him to adopt cultivated meat is high. If we decide not to influence him to adopt cultivated meat, then the probability that he will continue to exploit animals as much as he already does is very high. This outcome is, at least in part, our responsibility, since we play a crucial role in how the outcomes unfold.

However, the opponent of cultivated meat could point out that, in real life, we are not in a position to influence each animal exploiter as the example suggests. Yet the advocate of cultivated meat could reply that it is the very fact of whether or not the technology is available, and how economical it is, that will be the decisive factor of influence, since if cultivated meat becomes cheaper than conventional meat, the exploiters themselves will prefer to use it, and that we can play a role in this process by advocating the importance of developing cultivated meat.

To this the opponent of cultivated meat could reply that, if the exploiters themselves are going to adopt it anyway should it become cheaper to produce than conventional meat, then there is no need for animal advocates to support it. However, the advocate of cultivated meat could reply that, if animal advocates' support for cultivated meat helps accelerate its development, cost reduction, and implementation, then they should provide that support, if their goal is really to benefit animals.

On the other hand, if the opponents of cultivated meat succeed, the most they would achieve with their campaign against cultivated meat is to get animal exploiters not to use (or to use fewer) resources on cultivated meat. However, the exploiters would probably not use those resources to create vegan products, but rather to exploit animals to make conventional meat.

The opponent of cultivated meat could deny that their actions have any influence on the exploiters' decisions. One could reply to this, first, that if the movement against cultivated meat grows, there could be social pressure against the technology (as happened in Italy), and the result, again, would be harmful to animals. Second, one could reply that, if the opponent of cultivated meat believed their actions had no influence whatsoever, they would not campaign against cultivated meat.

Furthermore, the advocate of cultivated meat could argue that, if in the future it is sufficiently developed, it may come to cause less harm to animals than even the production of plant-based food. For example, in crop fields a very large number of small animals die as a result of cultivation and harvesting methods. This problem does not exist (or would exist to a much lesser extent) in the case of cultivated meat, since it would be developed in controlled environments. Thus, even if animals came to be used to obtain the cells, this would still have a far smaller negative effect than that resulting from plant production. Moreover, as already mentioned, it may be that in the future it will become unnecessary to use animals to take the cells to produce cultivated meat.

At this point opponents of cultivated meat sometimes argue that, even if growing plants harms animals more than cultivated meat, growing plants is still preferable, because in that case the harm is collateral, whereas in the case of cultivated meat the harm is instrumental (that is, it is a means to the end).

Again, there are two possible replies here. The first is to point out that the harms to animals resulting from growing plants are often not collateral. For example, in crop fields, the deaths of animals resulting from the use of pesticides are an instrumental harm, since the use of pesticides is a means to the end of growing plants.

However, let us suppose that all the harms resulting from growing plants were collateral. The second, more important reply points out that whether the harm is collateral or instrumental is an agent-centered concern, not a concern for those affected by the decision. In other words, if what really matters to us is avoiding harm to animals as much as possible, we will base ourselves on determining which course of action has the best harm/benefit ratio for the animals affected, and not on whether the harm is collateral or instrumental (since, for the animals affected, this makes no difference whatsoever). This reveals that activists who repudiate instrumental harms but do not care about avoiding collateral harms (in this case, greater than the instrumental harms) are concerned with feeling falsely pure, not really concerned with the animals.

12.14. The objection that cultivated meat reinforces speciesism

An objection sometimes raised against cultivated meat is the accusation that it reinforces speciesism and may, for that reason, be counterproductive in terms of changing the situation of animals.

For example, Wrenn (2024, p. 8) argues that "it is important to recognize the symbolic violence that cultivated meat sustains"¹²². She compares cultivated meat to encouraging white supremacists to amuse themselves with AI-generated simulations of slavery, and to encouraging teenagers to take pleasure in school-shooting video games as an alternative to real violence¹²³. She argues that, just as these symbolic acts of violence can have negative consequences for humans, cultivated meat may further fuel the normality of speciesism and meat consumption and have negative consequences for animals¹²⁴.

According to the author, cultivated meat will become the next “happy meat,” with producers employing tactics similar to those they currently use to block public knowledge of how animals are harmed during production¹²⁵.

She argues that, on the other hand, plant products that convincingly imitate the taste and texture of animal meat do not threaten to reinforce speciesism to the same extent that cultivated meat could, since in that case consumers are aware that these analogues are of plant origin¹²⁶.

Criticisms of this kind rightly point out that cultivated meat is not free from the risk of causing harm (indeed, no practice is). However, this by itself is not enough to conclude that we should reject it. What would have to be compared are the probable harms/benefits resulting from a scenario in which resources would be invested in cultivated meat with other scenarios in which those same resources would be invested in other things (in addition to trying to imagine where those resources would probably be invested if they were not invested in cultivated meat).

It is possible that, if the same resources were invested in antispeciesist outreach, the results for animals would be better than if they were invested in cultivated meat (although this is also quite uncertain). However, it must be borne in mind that, while vegan investors would have some probability of investing in antispeciesist outreach if

they did not invest in cultivated meat, the probability that the animal exploiters who invest in cultivated meat would do so is extremely low, perhaps zero. Accordingly, we should encourage at least animal exploiters to invest in cultivated meat since, otherwise, they would invest those resources in exploiting animals. This does not mean that cultivated meat is free from causing harm to animals. It means only that the scenario that would probably occur in its absence would involve a vastly greater amount of harm, besides lacking the benefits it would bring.

The harms and benefits that would probably result need to be weighed taking into account the current state of the world. For example, since at present human slavery and school killings are not the everyday norm, it may be that encouraging the creation of virtual simulations of slavery and school killings has the potential to cause more harm than good. However, in a scenario in which human slavery and school killings were the everyday norm, if creating virtual simulations of these practices would considerably reduce their real occurrence, then doing so would have a positive balance, even if it also had the potential to cause some harm.

Moreover, it is also possible to question the thesis that cultivated meat would reinforce speciesism. For example, Bryant (2024, p. 9) argues that cultivated meat is likely in fact to help reduce speciesism, because speciesist attitudes both cause and are caused by the consumption of animals, since defenses of speciesism are often motivated by the desire to keep eating meat¹²⁷. Thus, if people stop eating animals, it may be easier for them to accept rejecting speciesism.

12.15. Advantages and disadvantages of focusing on changes in food technology

There is great polarization among animal activists regarding cultivated meat. There are both activists who strongly repudiate it and activists who see it as the definitive solution to the problems affecting nonhuman animals. As we have seen, both stances are completely mistaken. Polarization leads people to tend to see things in "all-or-nothing" terms, which is completely removed from reality. Seeking to avoid this, below we will try to list both some advantages and some disadvantages of

focusing on cultivated meat compared to other activist strategies for benefiting animals. This will provide a more realistic picture of the situation.

The debate about focusing on cultivated meat is an example of a more general debate about strategies focused on technological change versus strategies focused on social change¹²⁸. Thus, several of the things said here about the specific case of cultivated meat also apply to other technologies.

Important: in this and other similar debates, what is under discussion is not necessarily "should we focus on this or that strategy?" (although that is also a possibility). Another possibility is: how much should we focus on this or that strategy? Additional questions are: (1) is it better for everyone to have the same degree of focus on certain strategies, or is it better for different people to focus on different strategies? (2) Is it better for the same person to have the same degree of focus on certain strategies all the time, or is it better to vary the degree of that focus, and what does this depend on? We will not discuss these questions here for reasons of space, but it is important to remember that they are important questions if our goal is to be efficient in our activism.

Regardless of the answers to these questions, it is always possible to try to list the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy, its reach and its limitations. That is what we will try to do below with the question of cultivated meat.

In the following list, although some points are clearly strengths and others clearly limitations, there are others that are strengths/limitations at present but may cease to be so in the future, or that are strengths/limitations depending on whether or not the focus on cultivated meat is accompanied by other activist strategies. For this reason, the points in the following list are not classified as strengths or as limitations.

Points to take into account when assessing the degree of focus on cultivated meat:

(1) The greater the consumption of cultivated meat compared to conventional meat, the more animals are spared suffering and being killed.

(2) Cultivated meat has the potential to produce behavioral changes in agents who are indifferent to the fate of animals. That is, cultivated meat can lead even people who do not care about animals to stop consuming them

(3) If developed, cultivated meat technology may also come to replace eggs, milk, and dairy products on a large scale, benefiting an even greater number of animals.

(4) Perhaps cultivated meat technology or similar technologies may in the future also come to be used as an alternative method to animal experimentation and to xenotransplantation. For example, closely related technologies are tissue engineering and regenerative medicine, both developed from human cells¹²⁹.

(5) If cultivated meat becomes more profitable for the exploiters, they themselves will want to abandon the use of animals.

(6) For cultivated meat actually to replace the use of animals on a large scale, it is not enough for it to give advantages to the exploiters: it must also give advantages to the public. This is because the public will not necessarily be receptive to cultivated meat. For example, some people may raise the banner of "that's not natural!" or spread rumors that it is dangerous, and so on. However, if the public sees advantages in cultivated meat, the probability of acceptance is much greater. An example of an advantage for the public would be its becoming cheaper and/or tastier than conventional meat.

We can draw a parallel with the gradual replacement of animal traction owing to the emergence of the automobile. One of the key factors in this replacement was the fact that the automobile offered the public many advantages compared to horse-drawn carriages (speed, comfort, protection, etc.).

(7) Note that, as happened in the case of animal traction, the existence of a substitute, even one offering advantages to the public, does not guarantee that animal exploitation in that area will end. Today there is less use of animal traction, but animals still continue to be exploited for this purpose. Likewise, it is likely that, if cultivated meat comes to be cheaper to produce and offers advantages to the public, its large-scale implementation will happen and this will greatly reduce the number of exploited animals, but this alone does not guarantee that animal exploitation for consumption will end. Therefore, it is necessary to combine technology-focused activism with activism focused on changes in consideration for animals.

Moreover, since the adoption of cultivated meat does not, by itself, change people's mindset regarding speciesism, it does not prevent setbacks in what is done to animals. For example, if people remain speciesist and some more profitable way of exploiting animals emerges in the future, they would probably go back to exploiting animals. Thus, activism focused on technologies that replace the use of animals is not a substitute for antispeciesist activism. Indeed, it needs such activism so that there are no setbacks.

On the other hand, however, the adoption of cultivated meat may make social change easier in terms of the rejection of speciesism. Many people defend speciesism not because they believe it is correct, but simply because they like the taste of animal products. Thus, if in the future people do not have to give up that taste because they are already consuming cultivated meat, it may be easier for them to accept an antispeciesist worldview. Therefore, the adoption of cultivated meat may also have the potential to facilitate the rejection of speciesism. However, there is also the possibility that many people defend speciesism simply because they think it is correct, and not because they like the taste of animal-based food. Yet in this case, too, the only way to combat such a view is by setting out the arguments against speciesism. So, either way, antispeciesist activism is always necessary.

(8) At present, the focus of activism centered on cultivated meat has been almost exclusively on reducing the number of exploited animals. However, the technology also seems to have the potential to be applied to reduce the suffering and deaths that animals endure as a result of natural processes¹³⁰. Incredible as it may seem at first glance, the number of animals who suffer and die as a result of such processes (hunger, thirst, disease, natural disasters, conflicts between animals, etc.) is vastly greater than the number of exploited animals. Cultivated meat technology could be used, for example, to reduce the incidence of predation¹³¹. Just as cultivated meat is already available for dogs and cats in certain places, it could become available in the future for wild animals, and this could be applied both to predators under human control (for example, in sanctuaries) and to those in the wild.

12.16. Conclusion

Above, we saw what cultivated meat technology consists of and addressed three debates surrounding it.

The first debate addressed objections to cultivated meat that are not centered on concern for animals. We saw that all of these objections suffer from speciesism and would not pass the impartiality test, and are therefore unjust.

The second debate addressed objections to cultivated meat put forward by animal advocates. We saw that, although at present cultivated meat still involves the use of animals as a source of cells, this may be unnecessary in the future. We also saw that, even if cultivated meat still causes some harm to animals, if animal exploiters do not invest in cultivated meat, they will very probably invest those resources in practices that result in far more harm to animals (and to a far greater number of animals). Moreover, we saw that it is possible that in the future the production of cultivated meat may come to cause less harm to animals than even the production of plants (because of the deaths of animals in planting and harvesting procedures). Therefore, animal advocates should be in favor of cultivated meat.

Finally, the third debate listed some important points to take into account when assessing how much animal activists should focus on cultivated meat compared to focusing on other kinds of strategy. We saw that activism focused on technological change (as is the case with cultivated meat) does not replace antispeciesist educational activism, but that, if combined with it, it offers good opportunities for positive change and prevents setbacks for animals.

Finally, we also saw that, although at present the use of cultivated meat technology is focused on reducing animal exploitation, it has the potential in the future to be used also to reduce the harms animals endure as a result of natural processes, especially with regard to predation. Of course, there may be other, more efficient ways of reducing the suffering of wild animals, including suffering that results from predation, than investing in cultivated meat technology. One example is reducing primary productivity¹³². Regardless of this, however, cultivated meat proves to be a very promising technology in terms of reducing the suffering and deaths of animals, whether those exploited by humans or those outside human control.