Changing Public Debate, Forms of Activism, and Political Institutions

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume IX, p. 72 of the PDF edition · English translation

11.1. Politics and s-risks

S-risks are risks that suffering will be multiplied enormously in the future, to the point of exceeding the suffering that exists today by several orders of magnitude.

In chapter 9 of his book Avoiding the Worst Final⁹³, Tobias Baumann discusses the importance of changes in politics if our goal is to prevent s-risks. Magnus Vinding's book Reasoned Politics⁹⁴, in turn, is devoted entirely to discussing this question. In this chapter we will look at a summary of the ideas these authors present. In addition, we will discuss some further points about how to incorporate the necessary changes into public debate in the context of activism for different causes, especially animal advocacy.

The term politics is usually associated only with institutions, but, in more general terms, it refers to all publicly conducted activities concerning how society should be organized, whether in terms of which goals society should pursue or in terms of how to achieve those goals. The outcomes of politics depend not only on institutions but also on how public discussion takes place, which includes the way social movements carry out activism. It is in this broad sense that the term politics will be used here.

The lack of a well-informed public discussion (whether in descriptive or in normative terms) runs a great risk of increasing polarization, obstructing efforts to reduce s-risks, increasing the risk of agents with malevolent traits coming to power, and even preventing discussion of any ethical or political question. So trying to improve politics is crucial for preventing s-risks. Below we will look at some suggestions for how this can be done.

11.2. The two-step ideal

One of the problems Vinding and Baumann point out regarding current public debate is the

confusion between questions that are normative and questions that are empirical. To improve public discussion, both authors suggest the two-step ideal⁹⁵, which consists of:

Normative step: clarifying the goals that should guide political decisions (debating in order to refine the values that would form the pillars of collective decisions),

Empirical step: asking which policies would best achieve these goals.

We would think like philosophers at the normative level and like scientists at the empirical level. The way public discussion takes place today conflates empirical and normative aspects, which prevents clear thinking. The framework suggested by Vinding and Baumann allows us to see on which points we disagree and where there is agreement, which can result in mutual compromise and even moral progress.

To achieve such an ideal, we need to recognize the biases that prevent us from approaching political questions with an open mind, such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning⁹⁶. If we seek to discuss moral arguments and empirical evidence honestly, we can reduce overconfidence in political views. For example, this would incline us to try to understand how a certain policy works before supporting or rejecting it. It would also allow us to weigh the positive and negative points of each proposal, instead of seeing things in terms of "all positive" or "all negative."

A better-grounded political debate would reduce the likelihood of polarization, since it would allow people to analyze the positive and negative points of each proposal, instead of idolizing their own side and demonizing the opposing side. This openness to nuance, by reducing polarization, would in turn reduce the chances of demagogues with malevolent traits rising to power. For all these reasons, the two-step ideal would increase the likelihood of preventing s-risks.

The central aim underlying the two-step ideal is to improve not only political institutions but the way people in general conduct public debate.

11.3. Tribal nature and polarization

The desire to belong to a group is among the factors that most determine our political judgments⁹⁷. This means that most people's interest lies not in carefully analyzing the pros and cons of different political proposals, but in signaling loyalty (to a party, a social movement, and so on).

Our brains tend to process political questions and individuals in an emotionally charged way and in "zero or one" terms. Instinctively, we tend to see our political tribe and its leaders in an excessively positive light and to demonize the other side.

This leads us to excessive confidence in our group's ideals and to hostility toward rival groups. It also leads us to see only the positive aspects of our own side and only the negative aspects of the opposing side. When exacerbated, this tendency even leads us to deliberately conceal the negative aspects of our own side and the positive aspects of the opposing side. Uncertainty and nuance do not fit this mindset, much less the recognition that, despite disagreements, we might reach mutual compromises. According to this mindset, every argument, and even the facts, must favor "our side" (otherwise they will be disregarded or may even be distorted to favor one's own side). One's own side is idolized and seen as the supreme example of goodness and justice. The other side is seen as the enemy, as evil incarnate. The possibility that we may be mistaken and may need to refine our view (whether about facts or about values) has no place in this mindset.

Trying to limit the influence of this tendency would prevent excessive polarization (which is a risk factor for s-risks). Thus, raising the standards of public discourse is a promising way to reduce s-risks, since it would encourage a mindset based on nuance.

Reducing tribalism opens the door not only to serious analysis of ethical arguments and facts, but also to cooperation and mutual compromise, despite disagreements. All sides stand to gain if we think in terms of outcomes rather than "crushing the other side." Signaling loyalty creates the appearance of great disagreement even

when the disagreement is limited, since it creates the desire to "crush the other side." This is also a reason to focus discourse more on policies than on parties or individuals (especially on mutually beneficial policies).

The risk of polarization exists not only with respect to politics in terms of parties and camps such as left and right. It also exists within social causes. For example, within the animal advocacy movement, polarization between groups that pursue different activist strategies can wrongly suggest that there is a difference in goals even when the disagreement is only strategic⁹⁸. This, in turn, can prevent mutual compromises from being reached.

11.4. Raising the standard of public debate

Baumann (2022, p. 67-70) suggests the following strategies for raising the standards of public debate:

1) Thinking in terms of nuance. This consists in carefully analyzing each side's arguments, being ready to identify what each perspective gets right and wrong, and thinking in terms of degrees of confidence rather than rigid certainties. This would avoid "zero or one," "us vs. them" thinking and the like. It would also avoid the tendency to demonize those who think differently. Moreover, it would create an openness to thinking about new questions and weighing arguments carefully, instead of making a hasty judgment based on first impressions.

2) Discussing arguments seriously and in an intellectually honest way, without distorting the position and arguments of those who disagree, and recognizing that we may be mistaken about many things.

3) More respectful conversations also reduce the likelihood of the worst scenarios. This does not mean "softening" the message (saying, for example, that speciesism is less serious than it really is). It means only discussing arguments honestly and openly.

In addition to these suggestions, we propose four further strategies here:

4) Focusing on discussing the plausibility of an argument regardless of who put it forward. As a consequence of polarization, in current public discourse (including within social movements), all that seems to matter is who made the argument. If the person belongs to "our side" or to the group we want to defend, their argument is accepted, however bad it may be. If they belong to the "other side," their argument is rejected, even if it is sound and points to a serious problem with our view. This tendency has prevented serious debate on any question, and unfortunately it has grown considerably even in academic circles.

5) Applying a method similar to the veil of ignorance to the discussion of arguments and political proposals. One way to try to get around the problem mentioned in the previous item is to discuss arguments and political proposals without knowing who their proponents are. Even when this is not possible, we can still ask questions such as "if we did not know who made the argument or who made the proposal, would we hold the same view?" or "if the argument or proposal in question had been put forward by the opposing side, would we hold the same position?".

6) Whether we are thinking about descriptive or normative questions, thinking about them not with the aim of proving what we already thought before, but suspending judgment and being willing to accept the best arguments and follow their conclusions, even if they lead us to think the opposite of what we thought before reflecting.

7) Adopting the broad-range approach strategy, which will be explained in the next section.

11.5. The broad-range approach strategy

Avoiding unnecessary confrontations increases the chances that the goals we pursue will be shared goals rather than controversial issues. We can reduce the likelihood of rejection and antagonism by adopting a broad-range approach. We will see more about it below.

The broad-range approach consists in trying to get the goal we want to achieve accepted by as many people as possible, regardless of whether they agree or disagree with us on other questions. If agreeing with a certain additional idea is not necessary for someone to accept what we are proposing, then it can be very positive to emphasize that, even if there is disagreement about that other idea, there could still be agreement about what we are proposing.

This has the advantage of reducing polarization (since it shows that, despite many disagreements, there can be a common goal) and also of increasing the likelihood that a much larger number of people will accept what we are proposing.

Consider goals such as:

• Consideration for all sentient beings.
• The prevention of s-risks.
• Longtermism⁹⁹.
• Reducing the suffering of wild animals¹⁰⁰.
• Rejecting speciesism.
• Rejecting substratism¹⁰¹.

These goals can be accepted without necessarily committing ourselves to a specific view, whether in ethics or in politics. Thus, instead of arguing that we should adopt a specific view in ethics or politics and that one implication of that view is accepting those goals, the potential for those goals to be accepted is greater if we show that they should be accepted by everyone, regardless of which view in ethics or politics they consider most plausible.

Defending specific positions without stressing this point can give the wrong impression that, to accept such goals, one must accept such views (and the result may then be that those who do not accept such views reject these goals). Note that this does not mean ceasing to defend a specific strand in ethics or politics. It means only that, even in that case, it is still worth emphasizing that those who disagree with that strand can still accept those goals¹⁰².

11.6. Improving institutions

Consider the following risk factors for s-risks:

(1) Excessive polarization (2) Acts of malevolent agents (3) Totalitarianism.

Political institutions are as influential as political culture in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of these risk factors. It is therefore worth investigating what could be done institutionally to prevent them. Among the suggestions that Baumann (2022, p.73-74) and Vinding (2022, p. 214-220) offer in this regard are:

Protecting democracy

Democracy prevents any single individual from obtaining a great deal of power, and thus reduces the influence of malevolent agents. Conversely, systems in which power is more concentrated increase the likelihood of malevolent and strategic agents gaining power. This is not always guaranteed, but it works better than in other systems. Thus, strengthening democratic institutions may be promising in terms of reducing s-risks.

It could be objected that the presence of democratic institutions does not guarantee that the outcome will be better in terms of preventing s-risks. For example, a democratic institution in which the vast majority of voters are speciesist probably has worse outcomes, taking into account all the sentient beings affected, than a totalitarian regime led by a dictator whose goal is to reduce the suffering of all sentient beings.

There are two ways to respond to this objection. The first is to deny that a benevolent dictator is better at preventing s-risks than a democracy. For example, since in a democracy it is easier to raise questions, and this would not be possible under a dictatorial regime, even that of a benevolent dictator, there would be no way to question the dictator's normative and descriptive beliefs when the dictator was mistaken. A system in which power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual is very likely to be guided by that individual's epistemic limitations. If, on the other hand, there is an open debate of ideas involving many individuals, the probability of error is lower.

The second way to respond is to point out that, even if the regime of a benevolent dictator had better chances of preventing s-risks, the probability of totalitarian regimes being led by malevolent agents is much greater than that of their being led by agents whose goal is to reduce suffering. This is because, as we saw in section 8.8, malevolent personality traits give many advantages in the pursuit of power.

Thus, if we compare the following scenarios: (1) a benevolent dictator; (2) a flawed democracy; and (3) a malevolent dictator, the third scenario is much more likely to result in s-risks than the second, even if the second scenario is more likely to result in s-risks than the first. Moreover, we have seen that scenario 3 is much more likely to occur than scenario 1. In terms of s-risks, it is more important to avoid institutional catastrophes than to try to achieve the best possible institutions. For example, in terms of s-risks, the difference between a flawed democracy and a totalitarian regime led by a malevolent agent is much greater than that between a functioning democracy and a flawed democracy¹⁰³.

Modern liberal democracies offer protection for human rights and civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, which are a precondition for raising moral concerns. For this reason, their suppression is a risk factor for s-risks.

How can democracy best be promoted? According to Baumann (2022, p.74), it is not clear whether it is best to try to install liberal democracies in nondemocratic nations, to safeguard existing democracies against backsliding, or to strengthen democracy in semidemocratic states. However, he emphasizes that it is essential to ensure that the promotion of democracy is not used as a pretext for pursuing economic interests, since this can discredit the idea of installing democracies and even contribute to greater conflict.

Political representation of all sentient beings

Another way to improve institutions is to try to establish representatives for sentient beings who cannot represent themselves (such as nonhuman animals and future beings). This proposal is known as sentiocracy, or sentientist democracy¹⁰⁴.

11.7. Why even a small improvement would make a big difference

Regarding the suggestions he made for improving institutions and political culture, Baumann (2022, p. 76) presents the following conclusions:

It is hard to know what the ideal institutions or the ideal political culture are, but the political status quo (whether in terms of institutions or in terms of public debate) is so bad that, to improve it, we do not need to know these answers. Although many people try to exert political influence, few are working to improve political culture and institutions. Moreover, aspects related to s-risks, especially those related to nonhuman sentient beings, are even more neglected. So even a marginal improvement in political culture or in institutions can be highly beneficial.

It is realistic to hope that we can be less biased and less tribal, to hope that institutions can work better, and so on. We can increase the degree to which politics is based on considered values and empirical evidence, even if we cannot change it for the most part.

Another advantage of these proposals is that they are beneficial not only for reducing s-risks but for many other goals (which increases the likelihood of cooperation).

It is important to pursue such ideals even if their large-scale adoption is not possible in the short term. Modest and continuous improvements can, after a long enough time, contribute to transformative change. A good starting point is to follow the guidelines we saw in section 11.4 in our own thinking and communication, and to lead by example, following the principles of intellectually honest reasoning.