If Sentient Beings Should Be Respected, Does Nature Have Intrinsic Value?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VI, p. 34 of the PDF edition · English translation

It is sometimes argued that if sentient beings should receive moral consideration, then nature has value in itself, since sentient beings are part of nature. On this view, this would also show that if we deny that nature has intrinsic value, we are at the same time disregarding sentient beings.

This view is sometimes raised as an objection to the proposal to help wild animals that are victims of natural processes⁴¹. This proposal involves intervening in natural processes such as hunger, thirst, disease, and natural disasters in order to benefit animals⁴². The objection then claims that if we hold that it is right to intervene in nature, we must also hold that it is right to intervene in sentient beings, even to harm them, since they are part of nature.

The premise underlying this objection is that if a part of something is morally considerable, then the whole of that something is as well. However, there is no necessary implication from a part being morally considerable to the whole of which it is a part also being so. This is because the reasons for considering the part may not be present in the rest of the group to which it belongs, nor in the whole.

This is exactly what happens in the case of sentient beings: the reason we consider them is that they can be affected positively or negatively (because they are able to experience certain states as positive and/or others as negative). This characteristic is not present in any other part of nature, nor in nature as a whole. Therefore, the fact that there are good reasons to consider sentient beings does not imply that there are good reasons to consider other parts of nature, or nature as a whole.

It is therefore false that, if we hold that it is right to modify nature, we will be authorizing harm to nonhuman animals because they are part of nature. This is safely avoided if we make clear that the prescription is: nonsentient nature should be modified in order to benefit sentient beings.

It is precisely the confusion of thinking that “nature” and “nonhuman animals” are the same thing that gives rise to the (completely mistaken) idea that environmentalist views that advocate preserving nature as a whole necessarily also take nonhuman animals into consideration⁴³. This same confusion in the use of terms also seems to be what leads many people to approve of any and every environmentalist policy, mistakenly believing that they are supporting policies that favor nonhuman animals⁴⁴.