Volume VIII · Effective Activism · chapter 5
The Total Approach and the Sufficient Approach
Before you read study layer, not part of the original text
The total approach defends a complete ethical view; the sufficient approach shows that certain goals (such as consideration for all sentient beings) can be accepted from very different views. It is important to combine the two.
You can convince someone by showing them your whole view of the world, or by showing them that, by their own way of thinking, they should already agree with you on one point. Using both ways works best.
In a negotiation, you can try to convince the other side of everything you think, or look for the point where you already agree. Good negotiators do both.
- P1 Some goals are compatible with a wide range of ethical and political views.
- P2 The sufficient approach shows this and broadens acceptance of those goals.
- P3 The total approach discusses the complete ideal, including controversial questions.
- P4 Using only one of them carries risks: either we never dare to discuss what matters, or we push away people who disagree about everything else.
- C So it is important to combine the two approaches.
The chapter’s central argument in logical form. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. To disagree, you have to show which premise is false.
They say “To defend animals, you have to accept my whole ideology.”
Answer You do not. Consideration for sentient beings can be accepted by people with very different ethical and political views. That makes the cause broader.
More objections and answers in Debunking objections.
Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VIII, p. 35 of the PDF edition · English translation
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter we will look at two possible approaches to trying to get more people to accept the goal of pursuing a better world for all beings: the total approach and the . We will see some advantages and disadvantages of each of these approaches, and it will be argued that it is more promising to combine them, at least in most contexts. Several examples will also be presented of particular contexts in which they can be applied and combined, and of how this could be done.
5.2. Ranges of compatibility: open and closed
What we will call the range of compatibility concerns the number of additional ideas that need to be accepted in order to accept a given idea. The more additional ideas are needed, the more closed the range will be, since fewer people accept those additional ideas together. The fewer additional ideas are needed, the more open the range will be, since in that case it is more likely that more people will accept the idea, whatever they think about other questions.
It is important to identify how wide an idea’s range of compatibility is, because if we think an idea has a more closed range when in fact it has a more open one, we will miss the opportunity to get many more people to accept it. This is illustrated by the following example.
Suppose we want to defend idea A, and we believe that, to accept it, one must also accept idea B. We then start defending B in order to get people to accept A. In doing so, we imply to the public that, to accept A, one has to accept B. Imagine that we manage to convince some people to accept A, but that other people do not accept it precisely because they do not accept B. But imagine that we later discover that, to accept A, it was not necessary to accept B. Then we could have convinced many more people to accept A if we had not defended B (or, at least, if we had not implied that, to accept A, it was necessary to accept B).
Thus, if, for people to accept an idea A, it is not necessary for them to agree about other ideas B, C, D, E, and so on, then it is better to emphasize that, whatever they think about these other ideas, they can still accept A.
Emphasizing that, even if there is disagreement about other things, there could still be agreement about what we are proposing has at least two advantages. The first, an obvious one, is that it increases the likelihood that a much larger and more diverse number of people will accept what we are proposing. The second is that it tends to reduce polarization44, since it emphasizes that, despite the many disagreements, there may be some goals in common.
5.3. Examples of views compatible with multiple views in ethics and politics
To accept the following goals, it is not necessary to adopt a specific view, whether in terms of ethical theory or in terms of political orientation:
- Consideration for all sentient beings.
- Rejection of speciesism.
- Abolition of animal exploitation.
- Veganism
- Reduction of the suffering of wild animals.
- Prevention of risks of future suffering.
- Concern for the long-term future.
- Consideration for nonorganic sentient beings, should they come to exist in the future.
Thus, instead of defending a specific view in ethics or politics and pointing out that one implication of that view is accepting those goals, we are more likely to get people to accept these goals if we argue that they should be accepted by everyone, regardless of which view in ethics or politics they adopt. Defending specific positions may give the mistaken impression that, to accept the goals in question, it is necessary to accept those specific views (with the result that those who do not accept such views reject these goals).
5.4. The total approach and the sufficient approach
Above we gave examples of goals that can be accepted in their entirety by various positions. At other times, however, depending on what someone thinks about other questions, they will accept a given goal only to a certain extent.
When we argue in favor of an idea, we usually understand the situation in terms of accepting it or rejecting it entirely. However, there is the possibility that someone might accept it partially. Of course, if we defend a given idea, we will think it best that other people accept it fully. However, it can be well worth emphasizing that certain arguments that are sometimes put forward in an attempt to reject the idea we are proposing do not actually imply rejecting it, but rather accepting it partially. By emphasizing this, we increase the chances that even those who disagree with its complete acceptance will still accept it at least to some extent.
In this sense, we can distinguish two approaches:
Total approach: defending what we believe to be the best decision.
Sufficient approach: emphasizing that even those who disagree with our position can accept it partially or accept some of its implications.
Important: these are not mutually exclusive strategies. In fact, at the end of this chapter it will be argued not only that we have better chances of better results if we combine both, but also that it is risky to employ only one of them.
The following table lists several examples of these approaches with regard to various topics:
| Topic | Total approach | Risks involved | Sufficient approach |
|---|---|---|---|
| Criterion for moral consideration | Arguing that the beings we ought to consider are sentient beings, and only sentient beings. | Those who think we owe moral consideration to nonsentient entities may think they are justified in disregarding sentient beings. | Emphasizing that even those who argue for considering nonsentient entities should recognize that being sentient should be sufficient for being considered, and that there are still reasons to prioritize sentient beings over nonsentient entities, whether these are wholes or living organisms. |
| Ethical theory | Defending a specific ethical theory that we consider most plausible, and showing that it implies rejecting speciesism. | Those who do not accept that specific theory may think they do not need to reject speciesism. | Emphasizing that, to accept the arguments for rejecting speciesism, it is not necessary to adopt a specific ethical theory. |
| Political orientation | Defending a specific political orientation, and showing that its ideals are realized only if we reject speciesism. | Those of any other political orientation may think they do not need to reject speciesism. | Emphasizing that speciesism should be rejected, regardless of which political orientation someone prefers. |
| Veganism | Advocating veganism. | Given the prevailing degree of speciesism, many people may find the standard too demanding and not change their consumption at all. | Emphasizing that even those who have not yet become vegan can still reduce their consumption and do other things to help animals. |
| Speciesism | Rejecting speciesism and arguing that we ought to give equal consideration to all sentient beings. | Given the prevailing degree of speciesism, many people may not agree with this and therefore think they need not give any consideration at all to nonhuman animals. | Emphasizing that, even if humans deserved greater consideration, this would not imply that animals deserve no consideration at all, nor that they deserve little consideration. |
| Speciesism and cause prioritization | Arguing that equal consideration implies prioritizing the situation of nonhuman sentient beings (given the number of victims, degree of neglectedness, etc.). | Speciesist people, because they disagree with equal consideration, may think they need not pay much attention to the situation of nonhuman animals. | Emphasizing that, even if someone gives greater weight to humans, given the number of victims, they would still have to prioritize the situation of nonhuman animals. It also helps to emphasize that, even if someone prioritizes human problems, they should still consider it very important to do something for nonhuman animals. |
| Magnitude of the harm of death | Arguing that belonging to the human species or having greater cognitive capacities does not necessarily imply being harmed by death to a greater degree. | People who disagree with this may think that animals are harmed little by death. | Pointing out that, from the fact that one individual is harmed by death to a greater degree than another, it does not follow that the individual who is harmed less is harmed little by death. |
| The harm of death | Arguing that nonhuman animals are harmed by death. | Those who think they are not harmed by death may think it is justified to exploit them or not to help them when they are victims of natural processes. | Showing that, in the vast majority of cases, for us to be against their exploitation and in favor of helping them in the wild, it is enough to recognize that they are harmed by suffering. |
| Well-being of sentient beings | Defending a specific position in the theory of well-being. (For example, arguing that all that matters, in terms of the well-being of sentient beings, is suffering and pleasure — that is, defending a hedonistic theory of well-being). | People who believe that other things matter in themselves for well-being (preference satisfaction, knowledge, relationships, etc.) may think that suffering and pleasure do not matter. | Emphasizing that believing that things other than suffering and pleasure matter for well-being does not imply that suffering and pleasure do not matter. |
| Prioritization with regard to the future | Arguing that we should prioritize the long-term future and prioritize avoiding risks of future suffering (called s-risks). | Those who disagree with this may think they need not be concerned with the long-term future and with s-risks. | Emphasizing that even those who have other priorities still have reasons to think that the long-term future and avoiding s-risks are very important. |
| Interventions affecting wild animals: sentience-centered goals versus environmentalist goals. | Arguing that, when making decisions that affect wild animals, we should adopt a view centered solely on sentience (and reject environmentalist goals), and that this implies helping animals in the wild. | People who adopt environmentalist values may think they are justified in opposing helping wild animals | Pointing out that arguing that nonsentient entities are morally considerable does not show that sentient beings are not, and that we still have reasons to prioritize sentient beings, even if we had to consider nonsentient entities. It can also be shown that many programs to help wild animals do not conflict with environmentalist goals (some would even help achieve them). |
| Focus on the situation of animals in the wild who are victims of natural processes (compared to exploited animals). | Arguing for focusing on the situation of animals in the wild who are victims of natural processes, rather than on exploited animals (given the number of victims, degree of neglectedness, tractability, etc.). | People who focus on exploited animals may think they are justified in disregarding the situation of wild animals. | Emphasizing that even those who have other focuses should still devote at least part of their activism to talking about the issue of wild animal suffering. |
| Moral responsibility for natural harms and anthropogenic harms | Arguing that we have as much moral responsibility for natural harms as we have for anthropogenic harms. | People who believe they are more responsible for anthropogenic harms may think we have no duty to do anything about natural harms | Emphasizing that arguing that we are morally responsible to a greater degree for one thing does not imply arguing that we are not responsible for another (one can argue, for example, that we are responsible to a high degree, even if to a lesser one). It can also be emphasized that the amount of natural harm is so much greater than that of anthropogenic harm that we would still have to prioritize reducing natural harms even if we gave much greater weight to anthropogenic ones. |
| Helping wild animals and veganism | Arguing that we ought to be vegan and also be in favor of helping animals in the wild. | Those who are not vegan may think they can be in favor of helping wild animals only if they someday become vegan | Emphasizing that, if we can do something to help, we should do it, regardless of whether or not we are doing other things to help. |
| Activism strategies | Emphatically defending certain activism strategies that we believe to be the best. | Advocates who prefer other strategies may think that mutual commitments with us are not possible. | Emphasizing that we can agree on certain strategies even if we disagree on others. It also helps to emphasize that, despite the strategic disagreement, the goal pursued is shared. |
| Consideration for sentient beings and other philosophical questions | Defending consideration for sentient beings and also speaking out openly on various other philosophical questions (ethical, political, metaphysical, epistemological, etc.) | The range of disagreement on all these questions is very wide. This may lead people (especially if we defend controversial views on other topics) not to accept our advocacy of consideration for sentient beings. | Emphasizing that consideration for sentient beings can be accepted regardless of what someone thinks about other philosophical questions. However, this does not mean that we should not take sides on these other questions, even if they are highly controversial (although that is another possibility as well). |
| Criteria for sentience and the nature of consciousness | Defending a specific position in philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness and arguing that it implies recognizing that beings with a centralized nervous system are sentient. | People who do not accept this specific position in philosophy of mind may think they are justified in denying that beings with a centralized nervous system are sentient | Arguing that we should recognize that there is a correlation between brain states and mental states, whatever we think consciousness is (for example, regardless of whether we hold a substance dualist, property dualist, physicalist monist, or idealist monist position, etc.) |
| Controversial implications of what we defend | Openly stating that what we defend has some controversial implications, and arguing that it is common sense that is wrong. | People may not accept our proposal if they realize it has these controversial implications. | Emphasizing that, even if someone disagrees about what to do in the controversial cases, this does not imply rejecting the proposal as a whole. For example, someone’s rejecting interventions in conflicts between animals does not imply rejecting vaccinations, treatment of diseases, disaster relief, etc. Another option is to hide the controversial implication. However, if the public notices the implication on its own, it will consider us dishonest for hiding it. |
5.5. Conclusion: it is important to combine both strategies
As we have seen above, both strategies, if used in isolation, carry risks. The risk of the total strategy is that people will mistakenly understand that, if they do not fully accept a certain view, they have no reason to partially accept what is being proposed. The general risk of the sufficient strategy, in turn, is that it does not discuss questions that are in fact very important and about which people perhaps ought to change their minds.
Thus, the question is about the degree of focus we should have on each strategy, since it seems better to use both. For example, one option is to focus on the total approach and emphasize that even those who do not agree could still partially accept what has been defended. Even if we opt for a greater focus on what is sufficient, this does not mean that arguing in favor of the total goal is not important. For example, a world in which many people are antispeciesist certainly has very different consequences from a world in which many people merely consider nonhuman animals, but to a lesser degree. Thus, the total approach is also very important (at least in many of the contexts listed above).
The decision to focus more on the total or on the sufficient approach depends on knowing what would achieve our goals most efficiently. For example, would they be better achieved if a larger number of people accepted them partially or if a smaller number of people accepted them completely? The answer to this will depend, in the case of each goal: (1) on the number of people who would accept it fully versus the number of people who would accept it partially; and (2) on how much more each person who accepts it fully would do to achieve the goal, compared with those who accept it partially.
Regardless of the answers to these difficult questions, it seems that arguing only in favor of the ideal, without emphasizing what is sufficient, involves high risks. On the other hand, talking only about what is sufficient means not daring to discuss very important controversial questions. Starting to discuss these questions as soon as possible can make a difference in the long term, by making the public less averse to thinking about them.
Practice
Study layer. The answers are based on the chapter’s text.
What is an "open range of compatibility"?
What is the chapter's conclusion about the two approaches?
Food for thought
Who do you disagree with about almost everything, but could agree with about animals?
Sources cited in this text 1
The full list for the volume is in the Volume VIII references.
- BAUMANN, T. Avoiding the worst final: how to prevent a moral cathastrophe. Center for Reducing Suffering, 2022.
This chapter in Volume XII
How the author sums up this debate in The Essentials of Animal Ethics.
Adopting an inclusive approach. (VIII, ch. 5; IX, ch. 11.5).
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