Moral Beliefs, Motivation to Act, and the Role of Ethical Reflection

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VIII, p. 55 of the PDF edition · English translation

7.1. The case of animal ethics experts who consume animals

This chapter is intended as a brief reflection on the question of moral motivation, based on cases that sometimes come up in the debate on the moral consideration of nonhuman animals.

Animal ethics is the area of applied ethics that studies the morality of our decisions that affect nonhuman animals. It is sometimes argued that the fact that there are animal ethics experts who continue consuming animals is proof that believing that something is right/wrong has no influence whatsoever on changing people’s attitudes.

According to this view, for people to care about changing a practice, it is not enough for them to conclude that it is wrong: something is needed that “touches” them, such as a shocking image or video, a song, an event in their personal lives, reading a moving story, and so on. In short, according to this view, nonrational persuasion is always necessary.

In this text it will be argued that it is hasty to conclude, from the fact that there are animal ethics experts who consume animals, that the belief that something is right/wrong therefore does not create a motivation to act accordingly. As we will see in the following sections, there are at least five other possibilities that may be occurring in the case of these experts.

7.2. Perhaps they do not consider consuming animals wrong

One possibility is that some of these people are experts in animal ethics but, for some reason, do not agree that consuming animals is unjustified. If this is the case, these people are doing exactly what they believe to be right. Of course, this does not mean that they are right to think so. It only means that, if this is what is happening, then pointing to the case of these people does not show that the belief that something is right/wrong does not influence attitudes (quite the contrary: it is their belief that consuming animals is justified that makes them continue to consume animals).

7.3. Perhaps they consider consuming animals only slightly wrong

There are degrees to which people consider an action right or wrong. For example, we normally consider running over a pedestrian a very serious wrong. On the other hand, arriving fifteen minutes late to a meeting is normally considered a minor wrong. That is why we take much more care not to run someone over than to avoid arriving late to a meeting. If this is so, then how much someone thinks a practice is right or wrong has a great deal of influence on how much they will strive to act accordingly.

Thus, it is possible that some of these experts give some moral consideration to nonhuman animals, but much less than that given to humans. Thus, even if they say they consider consuming animals wrong, perhaps they do not consider it a particularly serious wrong. And, once again, the case of these people does not support the thesis that someone’s beliefs about what is right and wrong have no influence on their attitudes. Quite the contrary: if this is what is happening, it shows that their attitude reflects precisely their belief that animal exploitation is not a very serious wrong.

7.4. Perhaps they are not being sincere about what they report

It could be objected that there are people who say they consider the use of animals for consumption extremely wrong, yet do not stop consuming them either. However, this is still not enough to conclude that the belief that a practice is right/wrong does not motivate someone to act accordingly. This is so for two reasons, explained below.

The first is that someone may say they consider consuming animals extremely wrong but not be sincere and, in fact, not consider it all that wrong. The second is that, even if they are being sincere, such a person may display the problem known as weakness of will, which we will address in the next section.

7.5. Perhaps they have a weak will

It could be claimed that there are people who sincerely consider consuming animals an extremely serious wrong and yet do not stop consuming animals. That is, these people display the problem known as weakness of will.

However, although cases of weakness of will show that moral beliefs do not by themselves determine someone’s behavior, they do not show that moral beliefs have no influence on behavior. In the case of these people, the motivation generated by the belief that consuming animals is an extremely serious wrong probably has to compete with other, opposing motivations (for example, social pressure, the pleasure obtained from foods they are already used to, the emotional association between food of animal origin and social events, and so on).

7.6. Perhaps they decide not to do what they feel motivated to do

Yet another possibility is that the moral belief creates a motivation to act accordingly, that there are no other conflicting motivations, but that the person simply decides not to do what they consider right and feel motivated to do. Such cases seem to be rarer. But, again, such cases would show only that moral beliefs do not determine someone’s behavior; they would not show that moral beliefs do not create a motivation to act accordingly.

7.7. Conclusion

The fact that there are animal ethics experts who consume animals is not enough to conclude that someone’s beliefs about what is right/wrong to do do not generate a motivation to act accordingly. As we have seen, there are at least five other possibilities for what is happening in these cases: (1) they do not consider consuming animals wrong; (2) they consider consuming animals wrong, but not seriously wrong; (3) they say they consider consuming animals seriously wrong, but they are lying; (4) they consider it seriously wrong, but the motivation generated by this belief has to compete with other, opposing motivations; (5) they consider it seriously wrong and there are no opposing motivations, but they decide not to do what they feel motivated to do.

All this may cause some people to feel disappointed about the power of arguments to change people’s behavior. However, this is hasty. What we have seen above shows only that arguments are not magical tools that give us control over the decisions of those who will hear the arguments. As we have seen, a person’s behavior is the result of many factors and, however well someone argues, and even if the other person accepts the argument, we have no power to decide whether or not they will follow in practice what they have concluded. Only they can do that.

In view of this, some people might then think that it is better to abandon rational persuasion and adopt tactics of nonrational persuasion. But the point is this: any other form of persuasion has the same limits. Faced with tactics of nonrational persuasion, a person may simply pay no attention, or may say they agree and not act accordingly (again, there may be conflicting motivations, they may simply decide not to follow what they feel motivated to do, and so on). Indeed, tactics of nonrational persuasion seem to have even greater limits, since rational persuasion at least manages to explain the reasons for accepting or rejecting a given practice. This seems to show that rational persuasion, with all its limits, is still the best we have.