If there is a need for environmental ethics, is the criterion of sentience wrong?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VI, p. 30 of the PDF edition · English translation

There is an argument holding that, if there is a need to develop an environmental ethics (that is, principles to guide our decisions that affect the environment), and if the questions addressed in environmental ethics make sense (that is, are not absurd questions), then nonsentient entities such as ecosystems or species have value in themselves, and not merely value as a resource for sentient beings³⁵.

However, the need to develop an environmental ethics does not imply that nonsentient entities have intrinsic value. One thing that may make it seem to imply this is that the term environmental ethics is commonly used in two different senses. We will look at this point in more detail below.

The first sense refers to environmentalism, that is, to the position that claims that certain nonsentient entities have value in themselves. The second sense, on the other hand, refers to a certain area of practical ethics that deals with the morality of our actions that affect the environment. Among the central questions addressed in this area, one of the main ones is precisely this: "do nonsentient entities have intrinsic value or merely value as a resource for sentient beings?". This and other related questions certainly make sense. But the fact that a question makes sense does not imply that the answer to it is necessarily affirmative. Below we will look at some examples that illustrate this point.

Questions such as "is there life on Mars?" and "did Brazil win the 2014 soccer World Cup?" make sense. They are not absurd questions. But it does not follow that the right answers are necessarily affirmative. Indeed, the right answer to the second question is "no". It makes sense to ask "do species and ecosystems have intrinsic value?", but this does not guarantee that the appropriate answer is affirmative. It is possible that the appropriate answer is "no".

The same applies to the claim that it is necessary to develop an environmental ethics. It is also necessary to develop an ethics for dealing with income distribution, but this does not imply that income distribution itself has intrinsic value (indeed, the opposite seems true: that this question is important because it affects the good of individuals). Thus, the need for

an environmental ethics does not necessarily imply that nonsentient entities have intrinsic value (it may be that there is a need for an environmental ethics precisely because sentient beings are indirectly affected by the way we affect their environments).

That is, an "environmental ethics" (the area dealing with the morality of our actions that affect the environment) does not necessarily imply an "environmental ethic" (an environmentalist position). The fact that the environmentalist position is sometimes called "environmental ethics" or "genuinely environmental ethics" contributes to this confusion. For example, it is sometimes argued that only environmentalism is truly an "environmental ethic", and that seeing the environment merely as a resource for sentient beings is an "ethic for the management of the environment³⁶". However, using such labels is not offering any argument in favor of environmentalism. Rather, it is assuming from the outset that environmentalism is correct. But that is exactly what is in question. It is, therefore, a circular argument (which is sometimes also used as a dishonest rhetorical strategy).

It is possible that the most appropriate approach to questions of environmental ethics involves rejecting this so-called "genuine environmental ethic" and embracing some form of "environmental management ethic" (for example, keeping or modifying the environment according to what is best for sentient beings). Of course, this does not necessarily guarantee that the environmentalist position is wrong either. The conclusion we should draw here is more specific: the argument from the need for environmental ethics, being circular, does not show that the criterion of sentience is inadequate.