The View That It Is Not a Problem Because the Victims Are Nonhuman Animals

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume VII, p. 16 of the PDF edition · English translation

4.1. The Disregard for Nonhuman Animals

The situation of animals in the wild is normally seen as a relevant problem only if it indirectly affects human interests or environmentalist goals, such as the preservation of biodiversity or of ecological balance. Underlying this view is the idea that the good of nonhuman animals does not matter in itself.

Below we will see why this view is mistaken. More specifically, we will see: (1) why the good of nonhuman animals matters in itself and (2) why this problem is just as important as it would be if it were humans suffering harms of the same magnitude.

4.2. Why the Good of Nonhuman Animals Matters in Itself

The view we are discussing assumes that the good of nonhuman animals does not matter in itself, but only insofar as it indirectly affects human interests or environmentalist goals (such as preserving species or ecosystems, for example). Such a view therefore assumes that the good of humans matters in itself and/or that the nonsentient entities valued in environmentalism matter in themselves.

One problem for this view is that what really explains why the good of humans matters in itself implies that the good of any other sentient being also matters in itself and, moreover, does not imply that nonsentient entities matter in themselves.

The reason humans are directly morally considerable is simply that they can be harmed and benefited. It is not because they have a set of complex capacities or a set of relationships with one another. So much so that humans who lack such capacities or relationships (such as young children and victims of certain accidents or diseases that affect cognitive capacities) are also directly morally considerable, and just as much as humans who have those capacities and relationships. The purpose of giving moral consideration to someone is to avoid harming and to seek to benefit that someone. Therefore, for someone to be morally considerable, it is necessary and sufficient that they can be harmed and benefited. Therefore, humans are morally considerable not because they are human, nor because they have a set of capacities or relationships, but simply because they can be harmed and benefited.

What makes humans capable of being harmed and benefited is the fact that they are sentient. It is sentience that makes there be someone “inhabiting” a body (as opposed to a merely living, yet empty, body). It is also sentience that makes it possible for an individual to experience certain states as positive and others as negative, because sentience is what makes someone capable of having experiences in the first place.

Accordingly, what really explains why the good of humans matters in itself automatically implies that the good of any other sentient being, whatever species it belongs to, also matters in itself. Moreover, as we have seen, this does not imply that nonsentient entities, such as species and ecosystems, matter in themselves. This shows how mistaken the idea is that the good of nonhuman animals matters only indirectly (whether to human interests or to environmentalist goals).

4.3. Why the Good of Animals Matters as Much as That of Humans

Someone could accept that the good of nonhuman animals matters in itself and still insist that the situation of wild animals is not a very important problem, as it would be if the victims were human. This is because, according to this view, the good of nonhuman animals, although it matters in itself, matters much less than the good of humans. Below we will see why this view is arbitrary.

If we have reasons to give moral consideration to someone because that someone can be harmed and benefited, then this implies that the strength of these reasons must depend on the magnitude of the harms and benefits in question, and not on the species of those who would be affected. That is, any unbiased view will hold that harms and benefits of similar magnitude in different individuals must have the same degree of importance (and that greater harms and benefits must have greater importance than lesser ones).

It could be objected that we sometimes have reasons to prioritize helping those who suffer the lesser harm. This would be the case, for example, if those who suffer the greater harm had done something to deserve that harm. However, this is not the case with nonhuman animals (since, like human babies, they cannot be held morally responsible). Moreover, unlike matters of desert (which depend on choices for which agents can be held responsible), the species to which someone belongs – like their race or gender – is a result of the natural lottery and is therefore beyond individuals' control (and so cannot result in merit or demerit).

Another reason why giving greater weight to the good of humans is a biased attitude is that it does not pass the impartiality test, since it would not be considered fair if we did not know which species we belonged to. This means that those who defend such a position do so only because they know they will be in the group it privileges. This by itself already shows that such a position would not pass the impartiality test. Impartiality is the main characteristic of justice. Therefore, there is no way such a position can be just.

4.4. Conclusion

If the argument above is sound, then the good of nonhuman animals matters in itself, and it matters as much as that of humans. This implies that we should give as much attention to the situation of animals in the wild who are victims of natural processes as we would if the victims were human.