Why Is Animal Exploitation Unjust?

Original text Luciano Carlos Cunha · Volume IV, p. 26 of the PDF edition · English translation

Consider the following claims:

(1) "There is nothing wrong with animal exploitation, since the animals are being raised for that purpose."

(2) "Eating animals is right because it is natural: it is the food chain."

(3) "Animal exploitation must continue; otherwise many traditions would be lost."

(4) "It is essential that animal exploitation continue, since many people make their living from it."

(5) "The problem with animal exploitation is its environmental impact; so there is nothing wrong with it if it is practiced in an ecologically sustainable way."

(6) "The problem is industrial animal exploitation; there is nothing wrong if the animals are hunted or fished directly."

(7) "The problem is suffering. There is nothing wrong if the animals are raised and killed painlessly."

(8) "The problem is not animal exploitation but capitalism. So there is nothing wrong with animal exploitation if it takes place within other economic models."

Now imagine that the same justifications were offered for raising humans in order to eat their flesh, make clothing from their skin, use them as test subjects, have them pull carts, or kill them in rituals.

None of these justifications would be considered acceptable. In fact, all of them would be considered repugnant. However, as we will see in detail below, all the reasons that make it unjust to do such things to humans automatically imply that it is unjust to do the same things to nonhuman animals. Below, two arguments supporting the claim that animal exploitation is unjust are presented in more detail.

2.1. It is unjust because it violates the principle of equal consideration

The principle of equal consideration prescribes that similar levels of harm and benefit be given the same weight, and that greater levels of harm and benefit be given more weight than lesser harms and benefits. This is so because, if what gives us reasons to avoid harms is their very negative character, and what gives us reasons to pursue benefits is their very positive character, then the more negative or positive they are, the stronger those reasons are. Giving different weight to similar levels of harm or benefit, or giving less weight to greater harms or benefits, is acting in a way that is biased with respect to the individuals affected. Below we will see why animal exploitation violates the principle of equal consideration by weighing the harms and benefits to those affected in a biased way.

Consider, for example, the use of animals for consumption. If humans consume animals, the animals lose their lives and, in addition, usually have to live a life full of suffering. On the other hand, if humans stop consuming animals, all they have to do is eat a plant-based diet. This is not even a harm, but even if it were, it would certainly be a much smaller harm than the harm the animals would endure as a result of being consumed. Anyone who has any doubt need only ask themselves which of the two situations they would rather be in: that of the animal who would be killed, or that of a human who would have to eat a plant-based diet. This shows that animal exploitation for consumption gives less weight to greater harms and therefore violates the principle of equal consideration.

It might be objected that there are certain cases of animal exploitation in which the harms to humans would not be smaller than the harms to the exploited animals. This would be the case, for example, when killing an animal would save a human life (that is, the harms would be equivalent). It might even be said that if, in the case at hand, the human would lose more by dying than the animal, or if killing the animal would save many other individuals, then killing the animal would be in keeping with the principle of equal consideration, since it would amount to preferring the lesser harm.

However, this is not enough to show that such a practice does not violate the principle of equal consideration. What would have to be shown is that, in a situation involving similar harms, it would be acceptable to kill humans. For example, suppose someone pointed out that a particular human would be less harmed by dying than other individuals, or that killing him would save the lives of several other individuals. If this is insufficient to justify killing him, then what is consistent with the principle of equal consideration is to conclude that it is also insufficient to justify killing nonhuman animals. Thus, even practices of animal exploitation that do not involve giving more weight to lesser harms may still violate the principle of equal consideration by giving different weight to harms of similar magnitude, depending on whether the victim in the situation would be human or nonhuman.

This does not mean that there can be no justification for making exceptions to the principle of equal consideration. It means only that the burden of proof lies with whoever advocates making the exception: they must present a well-grounded principle that justifies it. What would such a principle have to look like? One example would be to hold that if, for some reason, an individual deserves the harm they suffer, then there is justification for giving their harm less weight. For example, imagine that a normal adult human (and therefore morally accountable) tries to torture a child purely for fun but, being clumsy, falls out of the window and is hurt even worse than the child. Suppose we are the team arriving on the scene to provide help. In this case it seems we still have reasons to give priority to helping the child, even if she is less badly hurt, simply because here it makes sense to say that the torturer deserves the harm he suffered (and perhaps, for that reason, we should not even help him). This, then, would be a case in which the factor of desert justifies giving priority to the lesser harm.

However, none of this shows that there is justification for making exceptions to the principle of equal consideration on the basis of species, race, gender, brain complexity, and so on. Note that in the case we saw above, the exception to the principle of equal consideration was justified because someone morally responsible had first violated the principle of equal consideration. The species someone belongs to, their race, their gender, or their brain complexity have nothing to do with desert: they are all undeserved outcomes of the natural lottery. For this reason, there is no justification for giving less weight to the good of nonhuman animals by pointing out that they are not human or that they lack the cognitive capacities typical of humans.

Accordingly, one way of showing that animal exploitation is unjust and ought to be abolished is to show that it violates the principle of equal consideration, since it gives each individual's good a different weight on the basis of arbitrary factors, such as the species to which they belong (a factor that, like race and gender, is an outcome of the natural lottery).

2.2. It is unjust because it fails the impartiality test

Another way of supporting the same conclusion – namely, that animal exploitation is unjust – but by a different route, is to point out that it violates impartiality. We will see more about this below.

First of all, it is important not to confuse impartiality with neutrality. Impartiality is not avoiding making a decision and remaining neutral. Rather, it is making a decision that is not biased with respect to those affected. So not every practice that involves favoring or disfavoring certain individuals violates impartiality: the favoring or disfavoring has to be biased.

But how can we know whether a practice passes the impartiality test or is biased? There are several questions we can ask to find out. For example, we can ask whether we would consider the practice in question fair in the following circumstances.

(1) If we did not know which position we would occupy among those affected by it.

(2) If we knew that we would be the ones harmed by it.

(3) If the roles were reversed (for example, if the animals were the beneficiaries and we were the ones harmed).

(4) If we had to bear the harms it causes in order to obtain the benefits it provides.

(5) If we had to bear the harms it causes so that other individuals could obtain the benefits it provides.

If we sincerely ask ourselves these questions, we will realize that animal exploitation is defended only because its proponents know they will not be its victims. If that is so, then it is biased, since it clearly fails the impartiality test.

2.3. Conclusion

If what we have seen above is correct, then animal exploitation is not only unjust: it is as unjust as it would be if human victims were subjected to harms of similar magnitude. Yet if humans were subjected to harms of similar magnitude, such practices would be considered not merely unjust but a paradigmatic example of abominable and monstrous conduct. If so, then it seems there is no alternative but to judge animal exploitation in the same way. Most likely it is not generally perceived as such a serious problem simply because we are certain that we will not be its victims. This shows, once again, that it is a blatant violation of the principles of equal consideration and impartiality.

This also means that animal exploitation does not cease to be unjust, nor does it become less unjust, if it is carried out in an ecologically sustainable way, if it takes the form of small-scale hunting or fishing, if the animals are killed without suffering, or if it takes place within economic models other than capitalism. The problem is, first and foremost, animal exploitation itself, and not the form or context in which it occurs. For these reasons, the goal must be to abolish animal exploitation.