The objection
"We should only care about those who already exist. Future beings don't exist yet; they're just potential beings." According to this idea, it makes sense to work for veganism or for wild animals, because "that's about beings who already exist," but not to think about beings who will live centuries from now.
This objection comes up a lot when people talk about digital minds that might be able to feel in the future.
First answer: the future arrives too
The author questions the idea that we should only care about those who already exist. Future beings will exist and will truly suffer or be happy. When their turn comes, what we do today will have affected their lives.
Think about nuclear waste: the people who will be harmed by it a thousand years from now don't exist yet. Even so, we think it's wrong to store it in a dangerous way.
An important distinction
Someone might say: "We don't have a duty to bring new beings into existence, but we do have a duty not to kill the ones who exist. So we only have duties to individuals, not to possibilities."
The author shows that we can agree with this and still accept that we have duties concerning how our decisions affect the beings who will exist. It's not about creating beings; it's about not leaving a terrible world for those who will certainly be born.
In short
- The objection says only those who already exist matter.
- But future beings will truly feel once they exist.
- We have reasons not to leave a worse world for them.