The big question
Ethical theories disagree about a lot. But do they agree about what we owe animals? This chapter, one of the most important in the volume, shows that they do, at least on the essentials.
The argument from relevance
The starting point is an argument we've already seen in this collection: what matters for giving someone consideration is whether they can be harmed or benefited. And that's true of all beings that can feel.
Theories that aim at a goal
The chapter looks at several theories that aim at a goal:
- utilitarianism: the greatest total well-being;
- negative utilitarianism: the smallest total suffering;
- maximin: improving the situation of whoever is worst off;
- prioritarianism: benefits count more for those who are worse off;
- egalitarianism: less inequality;
- sufficientarianism: everyone above a line of a good life.
All of them imply equal consideration: if someone gives less weight to the good of a sentient being, they fail to reach the theory's own goal.
Theories about procedures and character
- Kantianism: Kant thought we owed animals only indirect duties, but Kantians today argue that all sentient beings should be treated as ends in themselves.
- Discourse ethics: animals don't take part in debates, but they're affected, so their perspectives should be taken into account.
- Contractualism: in its modern version, with the veil of ignorance, nobody would approve of exploitation without knowing whether they'd be the victim.
- Virtue ethics and the ethics of care: cruelty and indifference are vices; compassion and caring for the vulnerable are virtues.
The practical consequences
There are reasons, both general ones and ones from each theory, to abolish animal exploitation and to help wild animals.
In short
- Theories that aim at goals imply equal consideration.
- The other theories also have reasons to consider animals.
- All of them point toward ending exploitation and helping wild animals.
To compare the theories side by side, check out the Ethical Theory Comparator in the site's tools.