The question
Biocentrism says life itself has value, even without sentience. Does it? The author proposes some thought experiments.
Example 1: a total, irreversible coma
Imagine you have to choose:
- die now, with nothing afterward;
- or stay in a total and irreversible coma, with no experiences at all, not even dreams, forever.
If being alive were valuable in itself, the second option would be much better for you. But to most people, both options seem equally bad for the one in them. After all, in both cases, you'll never have any experience again. (There could be indirect reasons to prefer the coma, like your family's wishes, but not for your own good.)
Example 2: the cheating insurance company
When people ask "Is there life after death?", what they want to know is whether they'll keep feeling, not whether some body will stay alive.
Imagine an insurance company that promises you life after death if you pay every month. After 40 years of paying, you find out how it works: your cells will be kept alive in a lab, with no consciousness at all. You'd be outraged: that's not what you wanted.
Example 3: sentience without life
The author also imagines a being that feels but isn't alive in the biological sense, like a conscious digital mind. It seems that what would matter about it is what it feels, not the fact that it isn't "alive."
In short
- Staying alive without any experiences doesn't seem good for the one who does.
- When we talk about "life after death," we mean continuing to feel.
- The value lies in experiences, not in biological life on its own.