Volume XI

Referências

Todas as obras citadas em “Como as diversas teorias da ética abordam a questão animal?”, na forma da edição original. Clique em um ano citado no texto para ver a obra; aqui você vê em que capítulos cada uma aparece.

ABBATE, C. Virtues and Animals: A Minimally Decent Ethic for Practical Living in a Non- Ideal World. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, v. 27, p. 909-929, 2014. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
ADAMS, C.; DONOVAN, J. Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum, 1996.
ANIMAL ETHICS. Introduction to wild animal suffering: A guide to the issues. Oakland: Animal Ethics, 2020.
ARISTÓTELES. Ética a Nicômaco. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2009 [c. 330 a.C]. Citada em: cap. 2, cap. 5
BENHABIB, S. & DALLMAYR, F. (eds.) Communicative ethics controversy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990. Citada em: cap. 6
BENTHAM, J. Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 [1789]. Citada em: cap. 7
CALLICOTT, J. B. Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair. Environmental Ethics, v. 2, n. 4, p. 311-338, 1980. Citada em: cap. 6
CARRUTHERS, P. Against the moral standing of animals. University of Maryland, 2011. Citada em: cap. 6
CHANG, R. Hard Choices. Journal of the American Philosophy Association, v. 3, n. 1, p. 1- 21, 2017. Citada em: cap. 7
CLARK, S. R. L. The Moral Status of Animals. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1977.
CRISP, R. Equality, Priority, and Compassion. Ethics, v. 113, p. 745-763, 2003. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6, cap. 7
CRISP, R. Reasons and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Citada em: cap. 2
CRISP, R. Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, v. 4, n. 1, p. 41-9, 1988. Citada em: cap. 6
CRISP, R. Well-Being. In: ZALTA, E. N. (org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition),
CUNHA, L. C. A igualdade, suas várias interpretações, e a ética interespécies. In: BARBOSA-FOHRMANN, A. P.; LOURENÇO, D. B.; AUBERT, A. C. P. (orgs.). Estudos e direitos dos animais: teorias e desafios. Porto Alegre: Editora Fi, 2022b, p. 104-128. Citada em: cap. 6
CUNHA, L. C. Razões para ajudar: o sofrimento dos animais selvagens e suas implicações éticas. Curitiba: Appris, 2022a. Citada em: cap. 6
CUNHA, L. C. Uma breve introdução à ética animal: desde as questões clássicas até o que vem sendo discutido atualmente. Curitiba: Appris, 2021. Citada em: cap. 6
DALL’AGNOL, D. Valor Intrínseco: Metaética, Ética Normativa e Ética Aplicada em G. E. Moore. 2a ed. Florianópolis: Editora da UFSC, 2014.
DIAMOND, C. The Importance of Being Human. In: COCKBURN, D. (org.). Human Beings. Suplemento de Philosophy, v. 29. Cambridge: Royal Institute of Philosophy, 1991, p. 35-62. Citada em: cap. 6
DOMBROWSKI, D. A. Vegetarianism: The Philosophy behind the Ethical Diet. London: Thorsons, 1985. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
DRIVER, J. Moral Theory. In: ZALTA, E. N.; NODELMAN, U. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2022 edition. Citada em: cap. 1
DRIVER, J. Uneasy Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Citada em: cap. 5
DWORKIN, R. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. Citada em: cap. 7
ÉTICA ANIMAL. Animais usados por humanos. Ética Animal: ativismo e investigação em defesa dos animais, 26 abr. 2016c.
ÉTICA ANIMAL. Introdução ao sofrimento dos animais selvagens. Oakland: Ética Animal, 2023 [2020]. Citada em: cap. 6
FARIA, C. Equality, priority and nonhuman animals. Dilemata, v. 14, p. 225-236, 2014. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
FLETCHER, G. The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction. Londres: Routledge, 2016. Citada em: cap. 2
FISHBURN, P. C. Utility Theory for Decision Making. New York: Wiley, 1970. Citada em: cap. 7
FRANCIONE, G. Introduction to animal rights: your child or the dog? Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
FRANKLIN, J. H. Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
GEWIRTH, A. Reason and Morality. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978. Citada em: cap. 6
GLOOR, L. Tranquilism. Center on Long-Term Risk, 18 jul. 2017. Citada em: cap. 2
GOLDMAN, M. A trascendental defense of speciesism. Journal of Value Inquiry, v. 33, p. 59-69, 2001. Citada em: cap. 6
GOMPERTZ, L. Moral inquiries on the situation of man and of brutes. London: Open Gate, 1997 [1824]. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
GRIFFIN, J. Well-Being. Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Citada em: cap. 2
HABERMAS, J. Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press, (1996 [1992]).
HANSSEN, B. L. Ethics and landscape: Values and choices. Ethics, Place & Environment: A Journal of Philosophy & Geography, n. 4, p. 246-252, 2001.
HARE, R. M. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6, cap. 7
HARRISON, P. Theodicy and animal pain. Philosophy, v. 64, p. 79–92, 1989. Citada em: cap. 6
HARSANYI, J. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy, v. 63, p. 309-321, 1955. Citada em: cap. 6
HOBBES, T. Leviatã ou a matéria, forma e poder de um estado eclesiástico e civil. São Paulo: Martin Claret, 2004 [1651]. Citada em: cap. 6
HOLTUG, N. Equality for animals. In: RYBERG, J.; PETERSEN, T. S.; WOLF, C. (orgs.) New waves in applied ethics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 1-24. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
HORTA, O. Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild. Télos, v. 17, p. 73-88, 2010b. Citada em: cap. 6
HORTA, O. Egalitarianism and animals. Between the species, v. 19, n. 1, p. 109-145, 2016. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
HORTA, O. Igualitarismo, igualatión a la baja, antropocentrismo y valor de la vida. Revista de Filosofía da Universidad Complutense de Madrid, v. 35, n. 1, p. 133-152, 2010a. Citada em: cap. 3, cap. 6
HORTA, O. Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, v. 31, n. 3, p. 369-388, 2018. Citada em: cap. 6
HORTA, O. Un paso adelante en defensa de los animales. Madrid: Plaz y Valdés, 2017.
HORTA, O.; O’BRIEN, G.D.; TERAN, D. The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey. Utilitas, v. 34, n.4, p. 1-18, 2022. Citada em: cap. 5
HOOKER, B. Rule Consequentialism. In: ZALTA, E. N.; NODELMAN, U. (orgs.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2023. Citada em: cap. 5
HSIEH, N.; ANDERSSON, H. Incommensurable Values. In: ZALTA, E. N.; NODELMAN, U. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 edition. Citada em: cap. 1, cap. 7
HURSTHOUSE, R. Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the other Animals. In: WELCHMAN, J. (org.). The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006, p. 136–154. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
JAMIESON, D. Killing persons and other beings. In: MILLER, H. B. & WILLIAMS, W. H. (orgs.). Ethics and animals. Clifton: Humana Press, 1983, pp. 135-146. Citada em: cap. 2
KAGAN, S. Normative Ethics. Colorado: Westview Press, 1998. Citada em: cap. 1, cap. 2, cap. 3, cap. 5, cap. 6
KANT, I. Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals. London: Hutchinson, 1948 [1785]. Citada em: cap. 6
KEENEY, R. L.; RAIFFA, H. Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Citada em: cap. 7
KORSGAARD, C. Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, v. 24, p. 77-110, 2005. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
LEAHY, M. P. T. Against liberation: Putting animals in perspective. London: Routledge, 1991. Citada em: cap. 6
MACASKILL, W.; BYKVIST, K.; ORD, T. Moral Uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Citada em: cap. 7
MACHAN, T. Why Humans May Use Animals. Journal of Value Inquiry, v. 36, p. 9-14, 2002. Citada em: cap. 6
MASON, E. Value Pluralism. In: ZALTA, E. N.; NODELMAN, U. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2023 Edition. Citada em: cap. 1, cap. 7
MATHENY, G. Utilitarianism and Animals. In: SINGER, P. (org.). In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave. Malden: Blackwell, 2006, p. 13-25. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
MILL, J. S. Utilitarianism. In: MILL, J. S. Collected Works, vl. X. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969 [1861], p. 203-59. Citada em: cap. 7
NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY & SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION. Numbers of insects (species and individuals). Encyclopedia Smithsonian, 2008. Citada em: cap. 6
NOBIS, N. Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism Demand Too Little? Social Theory and Practice, v.28, p. 135–156, 2002. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
NODDINGS, N. Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984 Citada em: cap. 6
NOZICK, R. Anarchy, state and utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974. Citada em: cap. 2
NUSSBAUM, M. C. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2006.
O´NEILL. O. La etica kantiana. In: SINGER, P. (org.). A Companion to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. p. 253-266.
PARFIT, D. Equality and Priority. The Lindley Lecture. University of Kansas, 1991. Citada em: cap. 7
PARFIT, D. Equality or Priority? Kansas: University of Kansas, 1995. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
PARFIT, D. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Citada em: cap. 2
PEARCE, D. Can biotechnology abolish suffering? North Carolina: The Neuroethics Foundation, 2017.
PETERSON, M. An Introduction to Decision Theory. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Citada em: cap. 1, cap. 5
PETTIT, P. The consequentialist can recognize rights. Philosophical Quarterly, n. 38, p. 42- 55, 1988. Citada em: cap. 5
PLUHAR, E. Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
RACHELS, J.; RACHELS, S. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 7a ed. New York: Mc- Graw-Hill, 2013. Citada em: cap. 6
RAWLS, J. A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1971]. Citada em: cap. 6
RAZ. J. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 110-28. Citada em: cap. 7
RAZ, J. Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, v. 86, p. 117-134, 1986. Citada em: cap. 7
REGAN, T. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6, cap. 7
ROLLIN, B. Animal Rights and Human Morality. Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981. Citada em: cap. 5, cap. 6
ROSS, W. D. The right and the good. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930. Citada em: cap. 6
ROWLANDS, M. Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defense. London: MacMillan Press, 1998.
ROWLANDS, M. Animal rights: Moral, theory and practice. 2. ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 [1998]. Citada em: cap. 6
RYDER, R. D. Animal revolution: Changing attitudes towards speciesism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000. Citada em: cap. 6
RYDER, R. D. Painism: A Modern Morality. Opengate Press, 2001. Citada em: cap. 6, cap. 7
SANTOS, B. A. G. Três teorias sobre o bem-estar. Crítica na Rede. 11, jan. 2017. Citada em: cap. 2
SANTOS, B. A. G. Utilitarismo e Direitos Morais Básicos. Florianópolis: Editora UFSC, 2022. Citada em: cap. 5
SANTOS, B. A, G; GONTIJO, F. B. Introdução ao consequencialismo - parte 1. Guairacá - Revista de Filosofia, v. 36, n. 2, p. 05-33, 2020. Citada em: cap. 5
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SCHROEDER, M. Value Theory. In: ZALTA, E. N.; NODELMAN, U. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2021 edition. Citada em: cap. 1
SINGER, P. Ética Prática. 3. ed. Trad. Jefferson L. Camargo. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002 [1979]. Citada em: cap. 2, cap. 5, cap. 6
SKIRBEKK, G. The discourse principle and those affected. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, n. 40, p. 63-71, 1997. Citada em: cap. 6
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TEMKIN, L. S. Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection. In: CLAYTON, M.; WILLIAMS, A. (orgs.). The Ideal of Equality. New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 2000, p. 126-161. Citada em: cap. 3, cap. 6
TEMKIN, L. Inequality. New Yor: Oxford University Press, 1993. Citada em: cap. 7
TEMKIN, L. Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Citada em: cap. 7
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TRONTO, J. C. An ethic of care. In: CUDD, A. E. & ANDREASAN, R. O. (orgs.) Feminist theory: A philosophical anthology, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, pp. 251-263 Citada em: cap. 6
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ZIMMERMAN, M. J., BRADLEY, B. Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value. In: ZALTA, E. N.; NODELMAN, U. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2019 Edition, Citada em: cap. 1